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Health is one of the largest and most complex aid sectors: 16 percent of all aid went to the health 
sector in 2009. While many stress the importance of aid effectiveness, there are limited quantitative 
analyses of the quality of health aid. In this paper, we apply Birdsall and Kharas’s Quality of Official 
Development Assistance (QuODA)  methodology to rank donors across 23 indicators of aid 
effectiveness in health. We present our results, track progress from 2008 to 2009, compare health to 
overall aid, discuss our limitations, and call for more transparent and relevant aid data in the sector 
level as well as the need to focus on impact and results.
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Aid Effectiveness in Health 
Effective health aid has saved lives: the health outcomes of the poorest have steadily 
improved in the past century, some of which is likely due to official development assistance 
in health (Kenny, 2011). Over the years, health aid has progressively grown larger, more 
complex, and more fragmented. According to the Institute of Health Metrics and 
Evaluation, health aid has been increasing dramatically since 1990: from $5.66 billion 1990 to 
$27.73 billion in 2011 (see figure 1), mostly due to the entrance of non-state actors such as 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as new multilaterals such as the Global Fund 
and GAVI Alliance (IHME 2012). Bilateral commitments to health went up from 5.3% of 
total aid in 1980-1984 to 7.8% in 2006 (OECD 2011b). Official Development Aid in Health 
(DAH), coming from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, also increased, 
totaling $13.40 billion in 2009 (CRS 2009)1 and representing almost 16% of all aid.  
Health aid is as complex an industry as overall aid when it comes to the number of players: 
thirty donors have given aid through 27,900 activities – a 77% increase from 2008 (see figure 
2 and table 1), to 137 recipients. Donors differ in size and scope; the largest donor, the 
United States, gave health aid through 6,699 projects to 122 countries, amounting to $4.2b. 
The smallest donor, Portugal, gave health aid through 68 projects to 10 countries, amounting 
to $9.3m.  
Figure 1: Total Health Aid Disbursements, 1990-2011 
  
Source: IHME DAH Database, 2011 
                                                      
1 IHME’s DAH estimates cover non-DAC donors such as private foundations, multilaterals and NGOs, 
such as the World Health Organization and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and rely on certain 
estimations, especially for multilaterals. Given this methodology, they calculate the total DAH in 2009 to be 
$25.23 billion, but the total in the Credit Recording System is $13.37b. IHME looks at private citizens, 
corporations and foundations, which make up 27% of DAH in 2007; CRS does not have data for these. [See 



































While the effect of the current economic downturn will not immediately materialize given 
that multi-year commitments are lagged by a couple of years, it is likely that donors will 
decrease their commitments in the coming years (IHME 2012). Further, funding 
commitments that have increased are under enormous pressure to improve performance and 
demonstrate value for money.  
Figure 2: Number of Health Aid Activities as Reported in CRS 
 
Source: OECD CRS 2009 
Potential declines in health aid can be detrimental given the concentration of aid spending 
on recurrent costs (80% according to Action for Global Health, 2011) such as vaccines or 
drugs. This need to shift towards predictable and stable health aid flows has spurred 
innovation in the health sector, especially with the creation of special purpose funding 
vehicles such as the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund. However, these institutions are 
not immune to current aid trends: the Global Fund recently cancelled its Round 11 grants, 
which would cover 2011 to 2013, due to a shortage of money.2  
It is also important to note that health aid, as a percentage of GDP, is very small (see figure 
3): Luxembourg gives the highest share to health; almost 0.001% of its GDP. 
  
                                                      
2 Sarah Abelow, “Crisis looms as Global Fund forced to cut back on AIDS, malaria and TB grants.” 












Figure 3: Health Aid as a Percentage of GDP, 2009 
 
Source: OECD CRS, 2009 
Consequently, beyond funding constraints, it is important to consider the gap between 
money flows and results. Even before the cuts in global health aid, many were pointing out 
the difficulty of governance and achieving results in the field. Garrett (2007) highlights the 
importance of establishing sustainable health systems in partner countries, as well as the 
need for an efficient tracking mechanism of funds: even when funding is adequate, 
inefficiency can impede effectiveness; a 2006 World Bank report showed that about half of 
all health funds in certain sub-Saharan African countries never make it to frontline clinics 
and hospitals. Such issues increase the stakes involved in ensuring health aid effectiveness. 
Esser (2009) highlights the political reasons impeding aid effectiveness: priorities in global 
health are often set without evidence, and are threatened by inaction and financing problems 
even if they are. While it is impossible to quantify political obstacles that emerge in both 
donor and recipient countries, it is important to think of them as we discuss aid effectiveness 
in health and how certain issues can be overcome. 
The size, complexity and use of health aid to fund recurrent costs in recipient country health 
systems, past experiences with inefficiency, and the looming reductions in aid spending in 
donor countries all point to the exceptional importance of assuring that aid to the health 
sector is used as efficiently as possible. Agreed in 2005 by over 100 donor and partner 
countries, and further endorsed in Accra in 2008, improved aid effectiveness is defined by 
the five principles of the "Paris Declaration" (OECD 2011a), which are intended to be the 














  Ownership by partner countries on coordinating development actions 
  Alignment between donor and partner countries on national development priorities 
and institutions 
  Harmonization between donors 
  Managing for results and improving decision-making based on results 
  Mutual accountability for both donors and partners for development results 
Within this framework, the OECD has identified “health [as] a litmus test for broader aid 
effectiveness efforts,” choosing health as a “tracer sector” to track progress and obstacles 
(OECD 2011b). Each Paris principle is associated with one or several performance measures 
and targets; however, in 2010, only one of fifteen general aid effectiveness targets was met, 
namely coordinated support between donors (OECD 2011a). Donors have not met other 
commitments, including having an operational development strategy, reliable procurement 
systems or mutual accountability frameworks. 
The recently released OECD report on health as a tracer sector finds that –unlike overall aid 
performance- there have been significant achievements. The sector has created the Health 
Systems Funding Platform to harmonize assessments and coordinate activities and funding 
in focus countries (see Glassman and Savedoff 2011) and has launched a non-governmental 
effort to track implementation of the Paris agenda called IHP+ Results (see Box 1). 
Similarly, the “Harmonization for Health in Africa” initiative, involving AfDF, UNAIDS, 
UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO and the World Bank, provides technical support and capacity 
building to various African countries, working with existing instruments such as budget 
support and SWAPs (Dodd et al 2007). Some of the innovative financing mechanisms used 
in the sector, such as the International Finance Facility for Immunization and the Advanced 





























Yet aside from these global initiatives, to date, the evidence on progress is limited, case-
based and qualitative. Building on the IHP+ Results survey of 15 donors and 10 recipients, 
the OECD report finds that “aid effectiveness appears to be correlated with increased 
coverage and utilization of essential services, improved service delivery and health outcomes 
in some countries.” Various case studies conducted in Malawi, Nepal and Tanzania, sector-
wide approaches (SWAp) to coordinate donors are said to have contributed to an increase in 
the quality and quantity of service providers. Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania 
and Mali have all seen improvements attributed in part to more coordinated and holistic 
approaches, which are thought to decrease the deadweight loss of aid and increase public 
expenditure within recipient countries, as well as improved sector coordination and 
oversight. In Mali, for example, there has been increased dialogue between government and 
donors on country systems, and Mali has strengthened its policy, budget planning capacities, 
and strengthened its institutions (Dickinson 2011). Use of a health sector SWAp was 
concurrent with a 31% decline in infant mortality in Tanzania from 1999-2005 (Zinnen 
2011). In addition to SWAps, joint assistance strategies are said to improve harmonization 
and coordination in Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda (DANIDA 2005).3 It is important to 
note that these case studies – and many others we have reviewed in the appendix – merely 
point out to correlations, and it is harder to define a cause-effect relationship between aid 
effectiveness and results in health.  
Case-based information from the OECD suggests persistent problems in aid predictability, 
heavy bureaucracy and excessive dependence on process with a lack of focus on impact. 
More worrying, at the macro level, Wilson (2011) and Williamson (2008) find, with the 
exception of aid for infectious diseases, that even after controlling for income and 
                                                      
3 For a list and summary of relevant health aid effectiveness literature, see Appendix 3.  
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governance quality, overall health aid actually has no effect on reducing mortality. Health aid 
tends to follow improvements in health outcomes instead of contributing to them. This is 
partly due to the lack of allocative efficiency: Esser and Bench (2011) point out to the gap 
between the distribution of disease burden and health aid, finding that there is weak 
correlation between the responsiveness of DAH to national disease burdens.  
Results-based financing methods, such as cash-on-delivery or performance-based funding, 
where funding is contingent on the achievement of certain goals, are increasingly gaining 
prominence, although are far from being the norm. Cash on Delivery (COD) Aid, which is a 
method of results-based financing as defined by Savedoff and Martel (2011), incorporates 
paying for outcomes, hands-off funders, transparency through public dissemination, and 
independent verification of results. Implementing COD Aid in health would be feasible 
towards certain indicators, given the possibility of setting benchmarks, such as decreases in 
child/maternal mortality, reducing low birth weight and sustained HIV/AIDS treatment.  
Another way to improve allocative efficiency would be to increase partner country 
ownership: as locals would have a better perspective of how to allocate global health funding 
as opposed to top-down directives from donors. In 2008, The Accra Agenda for Action has 
introduced country ownership as a crucial component of aid effectiveness efforts, and 
various studies (Sridhar 2009) have pointed out to how country ownership can increase aid 
effectiveness; through mechanisms that hold donors accountable, strengthening national 
leadership in health and fostering South-South collaboration. Yet, to date, there has not been 
much progress in the area, highlighting both the difficulty of changing aid practices as well as 






























The absence of systematic, quantitative analysis of existing OECD data on aid effectiveness 
is a limitation of the tracer sector effort. While it will not help to establish the relationship 
between many aid effectiveness measures and health impact, in this paper, we address the 
absence of quantitative, comparable analyses of internationally accepted principles of 
principles of aid effectiveness (such as the Paris survey indicators), adapting and expanding 
the Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA) index (Birdsall and Kharas 2010) 
to health aid. Basing our analysis on the OECD’s 2008 and 2009 Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS), we measure aid effectiveness in health across 4 dimensions and 23 indicators, and 
rank donors in each dimension. We compare our results with the overall QuODA, and look 
at changes from 2008 to 2009.  
The paper is organized in four sections. After this introductory section, a second section 
discusses the QuODA methodology, defines key terms as well as the scope of the data used 
to rank donors on each measure. Section 3 describes each dimension, indicator and overall 
results. 
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Table 1: Donors included in our analysis, by size and scope: 2008 and 2009  
 










































Austria  13.55176 10.7514  -0.207 183  190  59  70  9 
Belgium  120.3199 128.0485 0.064  314  354  53  53  6 
Denmark  95.65341 129.3263 0.352  108  114  39  37  1 
France  120.7014 153.2671 0.270  277  383  83  85  5 
Germany  382.7183 397.6625 0.039  852  896  93  90  5 
Italy  121.02 103.042  -0.149  653 546  100  91  4 
Netherlands  272.851 212.8524  -0.220 168  133  44  31  1 
Norway  143.3354 133.1082  -0.071  372  376  69  69  4 
Portugal  7.948526 9.268216 0.166  30  68  8  10  3 
Sweden  236.8573 172.9392  -0.270  803  699  110  104  2 
Switzerland  52.7184 58.71447  0.114 262  248  48  67  4 
United 
Kingdom  851.6644 798.2772  -0.063  324  338  56  56  3 
Finland  33.83836 30.71009  -0.092  192  198  58  59  1 
Ireland  146.9715 117.7925  -0.199  572  376  64  51  1 
Luxembourg  56.86786 46.71642  -0.179  221  211  50  47  1 
Greece  13.39914 17.36406 0.296  54  79  35  40  5 
Spain  362.2661 296.0273  -0.183 1121  1258  92  89  8 
Canada  370.8005 435.2789 0.174  438  3613  77  134  3 
USA  3683.507 4227.646 0.148 6112  6699  116  122  11 
Japan  338.3695 341.7561 0.010  591  1040  137  130  5 
Korea  56.57429 89.29179 0.578  529  462  66  60  4 
Australia  202.6612 201.8319  -0.004  666  1198  41  68  1 
New Zealand  19.08959 17.67763  -0.074  72  67  18  19  1 
IDA  993.1146 1214.4 0.223  1678 1673  86  85  1 
IDB Special  0 22.22131  N/A  0 56  0  20  1 
AfDF  111.8177 104.3238  -0.067  56  41  27  26  1 
EC  618.0073 559.8665  -0.094  601  795  111  109  2 
GAVI  623.7839 367.4021  -0.411  465  409  70  72  1 
GFATM  2171.631 2336.844 0.076  471  442  110  99  1 
UN (Select 
Agencies)  475.1813 637.1831 0.341 4585  4938  133  137  5 
TOTAL  12,697 13,372  0.053  22,770  27,900        
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The QuODA Methodology 
Many analysts have worked to quantify aid effectiveness. CGD’s Commitment to 
Development Index (Roodman 2010) includes measures of aid quantity and quality (share of 
tied aid, allocation to poorly governed states, fragmentation, among others) that is combined 
with other measures of donor country policy that affect well-being in low- and middle-
income countries. Knack, Rogers and Eubank (2011) create an index that measures donor 
selectivity, alignment, harmonization and specialization. Before these recent efforts, Easterly 
and Pfutze (2008) characterized the ideal four dimensions of an aid agency, and Collier and 
Dollar (2002) looked at how aid could maximize poverty reduction.  
Using 2008 OECD data, Birdsall and Kharas built on these earlier efforts and created 
QuODA in 2010, an index composed of four dimensions (efficiency, institutions, burden, 
transparency/learning) which correspond to the Paris Declaration principles. In this paper, 
we adapt these dimensions to the health sector. 
The Maximizing Efficiency (ME) dimension corresponds to the “results” principle of the 
Paris Declaration, conceptually measuring the “development bang for the buck” of donors. 
More efficient allocation and spending could increase the value of aid; Collier and Dollar 
(2002) show that if aid were allocated more efficiently, it would lift 80 million people out of 
poverty instead 30 million. Similarly, as noted in Part 1, efficient health aid –funding the 
“right things” efficiently and at scale –has been shown to make a significant difference for 
health status. 
The Fostering Institutions (FI) dimension attempts to measure donor support to 
strengthened institutions in partner countries, corresponding with the “ownership” 
dimension of the Paris Declaration. Birdsall and Kharas argue that stronger recipient country 
institutions may increase ownership, defined by the OECD as “effective leadership over 
development policies and strategies.” This perspective is borne out, albeit by a sparse 
literature; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), for example, find that differences in 
institutional quality account for a significant portion of developmental differences between 
countries. Further, there is evidence that aid can weaken institutions; Knack and Rahman 
(2004) find that higher aid levels reduce institutional quality. 
The Reducing Burden (RB) dimension rewards donors that minimize bureaucratic 
requirements for partner countries. In 2009, there were 27,900 health projects, each 
associated with transaction costs. The OECD states that the deadweight losses associated 
with various redundant aid missions may be as high as $5 billion (Killen and Rogerson 2010). 
This is particularly important in health; aid recipient countries tend to have low technical and 
administrative capacity, and excessive fragmentation further leads to the deterioration and 
overstretching of these resources. Consolidation of administrative processes would make 




Finally, the Transparency and Learning (TL) dimension measures the possibility of 
“mutual accountability” by assessing whether the data and analysis necessary to determine 
whether commitments and results are genuine is publicly available. Transparency can be a 
cost-efficient way of increasing the value of aid indirectly: both donors and recipients often 
lack access to complete information, and are forced to allocate their budgets in this context. 
Increased transparency can reduce unpredictability, improve coordination, increase public 
support, increase accountability, and reduce diversion of resources to other uses; all of which 
can make aid more effective (Moon and Williamson 2010; Collin et al 2009). Despite 
evidence of the benefits of transparency, data are scarce; while progress on transparency and 
evaluation is hard to quantify, we try to make best usage of data available to us. Initiatives 
such as International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and Publish What You Fund have 
signed up donors to standardize and publish more of their data, regarding aid delivery, while 
the International Initiative for Impact Evaluations (3iE) promotes and facilitates the rigorous 
evaluation of development results.  
Within each dimension, Birdsall and Kharas (2010) use three criteria to select indicators that 
express performance in that dimension of aid effectiveness: indicators that are intrinsic 
goods, indicators that are proxies for important factors but that are not directly observable, 
and indicators that are inputs into a desirable outcome. All of these indicators aim to 
measure the quality rather than the quantity of aid. In the application of QuODA to health, 
we maintain as many of the original indicators as possible, while omitting some for lack of 
sector-specific data and including others in order to better reflect aid effectiveness in the 
sector itself. A description and justification of each dimension is provided in the following 
section, and detailed methodology for each indicator is provided in the appendix, as well as 
relevant literature justifying the inclusion of each indicator. 
QuODA calculates a “raw score” for each indicator for each donor country/organization, 
and then transforms these raw scores into a standardized normal variable with the mean 
equal to zero and the variance equal to one.4 The average of these standardized scores across 
all indicators within that dimension generates the score of that donor in that dimension. The 
score measures how many standard deviations the country or agency is from the mean value: 
hence, the relative success (or failure) of each donor. We adopt this approach without 
modification in health: looking at rankings through different dimensions underlines the 
relative strengths and weakness of each donor. 
QuODA weights all indicators equally within each dimension. There are various reasons for 
this: first, the relative “importance” of the different dimensions is not evident; making it 
impossible to, for example, value maximizing efficiency indicators higher than reducing 
burden indicators, or vice versa. Second, correlations between individual indicators are fairly 
low, implying that there is no “double counting”, or using indicators that measure the same 
thing. We maintain this approach in the application to health.  
                                                      
4 The methodology for the calculation of each raw score is described in Appendix 1.  
11 
 
Finally, we calculate an overall rank for every donor using equal weights, but we advise 
donors and readers to pay more attention to rankings within every dimension instead of this 
overall rank, given reasons discussed in the results section. 
Data and Terminology 
With a few exceptions mentioned in the appendix, data sources for indicators are drawn 
mainly from the 2009 Creditor Reporting System (CRS) aggregated by the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The CRS includes data on commitments and 
disbursements for DAC member countries, as well as multilaterals such as the GAVI, Global 
Fund, United Nations agencies, Development Banks, and the European Commission. In our 
analyses, we further aggregate five United Nations agencies: UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, 
UNAIDS and UNFPA, and analyze them together, given the fact that these agencies have 
small sizes and scopes by themselves, and often collaborate together in different health 
projects.  
Grepin et al (2011) outline the various challenges and difficulties in tracking DAH. While it 
is possible to look into aggregate flows for non-DAC donors and private foundations, it is 
not possible to look into further detail of these flows, which makes it impossible for us to 
include in our analysis. IHME (2011) has one of the most comprehensive DAH databases, 
and they calculate DAH in 2009 to be $25.69b. Excluding private foundations, as well as 
dropping projects with insufficient reporting, we obtain the values in table 1. 
For the context of this paper, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as “flows 
to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral 
development institutions which are provided by official agencies, including state and local 
governments, or by their executive agencies, and each transaction of which is administered 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its 
main objectives; and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 
25%; calculated at a rate of discount of 10%.” (OECD 2008) This definition of ODA 
implies that the large philanthropic and private contributions to global health described in 
the IHME report are not included for the purposes of this analysis, and their absence 
represents an important shortcoming. Based on this definition of general ODA, Official 
Development Assistance in Health (DAH) is the portion of ODA with the purposes 
described in table 2.  
Another key concept is Gross Country Programmable Aid (CPA). CPA is the component of 
ODA that goes directly into specific country programs – thus, it is ODA minus 
contributions to multilateral organizations, emergency nonfood humanitarian aid, 
development food aid and debt relief (OECD 2008). The CPA is what QuODA’s authors 
describe as “what remains for development programs.” However, for health aid purposes, all 
ODA is classified as CPA, since ODA that falls under health purposes does not include aid  
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to multilateral organizations, development food aid, humanitarian aid (nonfood) or debt 
relief.  
For several indicators, following Birdsall and Kharas (2010), we use an even stricter 
definition of CPA (sCPA) that further subtracts technical cooperation and donor interest 
received from CPA (OECD 2008). This stricter definition best reflects the budgetary 
contribution available to the recipient (Roodman 2006; Kharas 2007). 
All analyses were performed using Stata 12, and our data and program files can be 
downloaded from our website. We report standard errors for each indicator, and post our 
raw scores online. 
Table 2: Health Aid Projects Divided by Purpose, 2008-2009 
Purpose 
Code  Purpose Name  2008  2009  Change 
12110  Health policy & administrative management  2,062  2,969  0.44 
12181 Medical  education/training  315  364  0.16 
12182 Medical  research  235  509  1.17 
12191 Medical  services  823  864  0.05 
12220 Basic  health  care  3,105  3,755  0.21 
12230 Basic  health  infrastructure  713  787  0.10 
12240 Basic  nutrition  804  1,344  0.67 
12250 Infectious  disease control  1312  1,575  0.20 
12261 Health  education  342  626  0.83 
12262 Malaria  control  857  946  0.10 
12263 Tuberculosis  control  565  647  0.15 
12281 Health  personnel  development  501  591  0.18 
13010  Population policy & administrative 
management  1660 1,724  0.04 
13020  Reproductive health care  2,569  2,979  0.16 
13030 Family  planning  797  1,069  0.34 
13040  STD control including HIV/AIDS 5,634  6,538  0.16 
13081  Personnel development: population & 
reproductive health  41 127  2.10 
16064  Social mitigation of HIV/AIDS  435  486  0.12 
  Total number of health projects  22,770  27,900  0.23 
Source: CRS (2008, 2009) 
Dimensions and Results 
Although every effort was made to remain consistent with overall QuODA to permit 
comparisons between donors across indicators, the availability of health-specific data has 
limited the number of common indicators. As a result, while the Original QuODA has 31 
indicators, the effort as applied to health includes 23 (see table 3). In this section, we  
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describe our dimensions and talk about overall results – best and worst performers within 
each indicator can be found in Appendix 1, as well as relevant tables posted online.  
Table 3: Indicators, overall QuODA versus health QuODA 
 
Dimension 1: Maximizing Efficiency 
Within the ME dimension, we include seven indicators that measure three different 
perspectives on health aid efficiency – allocative efficiency, transaction costs and global 
public goods.  
Indicators 1-4 are focused on allocative efficiency issues – the extent to which health aid is 
allocated so as to –conceptually – maximize impact on health: share of allocation to poor 
countries, share of allocation to countries with high disease burdens, focus and specialization 
by recipient country and share of allocation to well-governed countries. The main goal of aid 
is to increase outcomes in developing countries; it is, however, not possible to link health 
outcomes directly to aid given data constraints: various studies (Esser and Bench 2011; 
IHME 2011) demonstrate the gap between need and the flow of money towards specific 








































how a dollar of aid translates into health outcomes: hence, this indicator does not determine 
an optimally health maximizing allocation (and how far each donor is from that allocation). 
Rather, this indicator tracks the extent to which aid tracks need, or potential gains. 
There are many reasons why aid might not or should not track need or potential gains; for 
example, because aid is allocated based on political, military or other rationale, because a 
funding agency may be restricted to working in regions with a large number of small 
countries (the Caribbean, see Acharya et al 2006) or because average needs may obscure 
important inequalities in less needy countries. Further, to some extent, these simplistic 
allocation rules used by most global health funders fail to acknowledge the complex set of 
factors that transforms efficiency into effectiveness. It is not only that funds are invested in 
the “right” countries, but also that they come in the “right” amounts with the “right” 
incentives. Another factor possibly decreasing the bang for the buck of health aid is working 
in countries with poor governance (fragile states), on which there is conflicting evidence (see 
appendix, ME4).  
Indicators 5-6 are focused on measuring the extent to which donor provide health by 
minimizing transaction costs: through increasing portions actually available to country 
budgets and through untied funding. Finally, indicator 7 measures the extent of donor 
support to global public goods.  
As described in part 2, the indicators are combined in an unweighted average index and 
donor countries are ranked in figure 4.  
Our indicators for the Maximizing Efficiency dimension are: 
1.  Share of allocation to poor countries 
2.  Share of allocation to countries with high disease burden 
3.  Share of allocation to well-governed countries 
4.  High strict country programmable aid share 
5.  Focus/Specialization by recipient country  
6.  Share of untied aid 
7.  Support of select global public good facilities 
We find that the Netherlands, Denmark and AfDF fare best in this category. Korea, Austria 





















































































Dimension 2: Fostering Institutions 
In this dimension, we have no overlap between the overall QuODA and health QuODA, 
due to the lack of data availability. Ideally, we would have preferred to include variables that 
track civil society organizations, budget support by each donor, avoidance of project 
implementation units, coordination of technical cooperation, as well as predictability: yet the 
Paris Declaration survey, which tracks these measures, does not have sector-specific data.   
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In our re-population of the FI dimension, we include measures that reflect donor support to 
national institutions that are thought to improve country ownership, including support to 
countries with WHO-recommended national health plans and support to essential health 
metrics. The small number of indicators in this dimension perhaps unfairly under-
emphasizes the importance of institutions to development effectiveness in health, but 
maintaining the dimension will allow for additional and improved indicators to be developed 
in subsequent estimations. 
Our Fostering Institutions dimension consists of two indicators: 
1.  Share of aid to countries with national health plans 
2.  Support to essential health metrics 
IDB, Norway and Finland fare best in this category, while the Netherlands, Spain and Korea 


























Figure 5: Rankings on fostering institutions 
 
Dimension 3: Reducing Burden 
This dimension uses four indicators from original QuODA that measure the significance of 
aid relationships, fragmentation associated with multiple same-country donor agencies in a 
single recipient country, median project size and share of aid through multilateral channels. 
We add an indicator reflecting donor country membership in the International Health 
Partnership Plus, an initiative intended to harmonize planning and funding in aid-dependent 


















































1.  Significance of aid relationships 
2.  Fragmentation across donor agencies 
3.  Median project size 
4.  Member of IHP+ 
5.  Share of aid through multilateral channels 
Overall, we find that the Global Fund, Australia and Canada perform best in this indicator. 
South Korea, Austria and Greece rank last. It is important to note that GAVI and the 
Global Fund, both multilaterals with the main goal of reducing burden on recipients, fare 
above average in this category.  






















































Dimension 4: Transparency and Learning 
In this dimension, we evaluate how open donors are in their reporting to the CRS, as well as 
their commitment to various other international initiatives on expenditure transparency, such 
as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). We keep all the indicators from 
original QuODA, and add membership to the International Initiative for Impact Evaluations 
(3iE) as a measure of donor commitments to rigorous impact evaluations, which are crucial 
in health.  
We find that the United Kingdom, Ireland and the United States perform best in this 
category. France, Luxembourg and Belgium are the most opaque in their reporting to the 
OECD Credit Reporting System database. 
Our indicators in the Transparency and Learning indicator are: 
1.  Member of IATI 
2.  Implementation of international data reporting standards 
3.  Member of 3iE 
4.  Recording of project title and descriptions 
5.  Detail of project description 
6.  Reporting of aid delivery channel 
7.  Completeness of project-level commitment data 
8.  Quality of evaluation policy 




Figure 7: Rankings on transparency and learning 
 
Discussion of Results 
In the previous section, we outlined our indicators and best/worst performers within each 
dimension. Here, we discuss changes from 2008 to 2009, compare health aid effectiveness to 
overall aid effectiveness, and introduce a brief discussion of health aid effectiveness in aid-
dependent countries.  
2008 versus 2009, across health indicators 
While our analysis above has focused on 2009 numbers, we also calculated 2008 values for 
each of our indicators to see how rankings have changed from 2008 to 2009 (see table A9 
for 2008 rankings, table A10 for 2009 rankings, and see table A11 for change between 2008 
and 2009). We also report means for both 2008 and 2009 for every indicator (see table A2). 
It is important here to note that if a donor’s ranking went down, it could be because their 
performance got worse, or, others’ performance improved relatively. For overall trends, we 




















































 A summary of the changes are below: 
  Maximizing Efficiency: Compared to 2008, allocative efficiency indicators (ME1-2-
3) have worsened in 2009 as donors, on average, have regressed in their share of 
allocation to poor countries, share of allocation to countries with high DALYs and 
share of allocation to well-governed countries. There were modest improvements in 
donors’ share of strict country programmable aid, focus by recipient country, 
support of select global public good facilities and share of untied aid.  
  Fostering Institutions: In 2009, donors allocated more to countries with stronger 
national health plans, and supported more projects that seek to gather essential 
health metrics.  
  Reducing Burden: Aid relationships became more significant from 2008 to 2009, but 
fragmentation across donor agencies increased. This was further followed by a 
decrease in median project size. All of this point out to the fact that as health aid is 
becoming more complex and fragmented, as many qualitative case studies point to: 
decreased alignment and donor proliferation seems to have an adverse effect as 
health aid continues to increase. 
  Transparency and Learning: While donors have reported more project titles, 
descriptions and channels, they gave less aid to partners with good M&E 
frameworks, and did a worse job reporting their commitments to the DAC website. 
The details of project descriptions also decreased from 2008 to 2009. 
When we look at overall rankings, calculated by taking the average of every indicator, we see 
that there haven’t been many changes in rankings from 2008 to 2009, except for Belgium, 
which has dropped down 10 places, and Australia, which went up 11 places (see table 4).5   
However, we believe it is better to look at rankings within every dimension instead of the 
overall ranking while comparing 2008 to 2009 as well as rankings within individual years: 
different rankings for each dimension lets us demonstrate the relative strengths and 
weakness of each donor.  
  
                                                      
5 As we have discussed before, we present an overall ranking as opposed to original QuODA, and the main 
reason is what due to data constraints, we have less balanced dimensions then original QuODA does: our 
fostering institutions dimension, for example, only contains two indicators, and except for transparency and 
learning, all our dimensions have less indicators then original QuODA. While dimension rankings are useful in 
highlighting the various strengths and weaknesses of donors, we believe combining all indicators provides a 
holistic view of aid effectiveness in health. Readers can download our spreadsheet and construct averages with 
the weights they specify.   
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Figure 8. United Kingdom, USA and Australia across Maximizing Efficiency 
indicators 
 
In figure 8, we look into the donor which ranks first in overall rankings (United Kingdom), 
largest donor (USA), and a donor with a rapidly growing aid program (Australia). We find 
that Australia scores below the mean in many indicators, but is focused by recipient country, 
and unties a majority of its aid. The United Kingdom performs above average in allocating 
according to need, untying aid and giving to global public goods. The United States is above 
average in terms of allocating according to disease burden, having a high strict CPA share, as 
well as untying its aid, but fares worse in terms of allocating to poor countries and focusing 
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Austria  -0.61183894  -0.49088  28 27 1 
Belgium  0.015842391 -0.25662 15  25  -10 
Denmark  0.277324894 0.354549  7 3 4 
France  -0.4100727  -0.51376  26 28 -2 
Germany  0.037573927 -0.11136  13 19 -6 
Italy  -0.24041614  -0.26778  24 26 -2 
Netherlands  0.516096033 0.444154  2 2 0 
Norway  0.491405305 0.336577  3 5 -2 
Portugal  -0.14762269  -0.15301  22 21 1 
Sweden  0.14070407 0.218086  9  10  -1 
Switzerland  -0.00169966  -0.08416  16 18 -2 
United Kingdom  0.571281586 0.634368  1 1 0 
Finland  0.078370597 0.214904  12 11 1 
Ireland  0.293240218 0.289329  6 7 -1 
Luxembourg  -0.10927453  -0.24675  19 23 -4 
Greece  -0.31575803  -0.66831  25 30 -5 
Spain  -0.02086698  -0.25215  17 24 -7 
Canada  0.102491928 0.208154  11 13 -2 
USA  -0.06405693  0.105603  18 14 4 
Japan  -0.53963487  -0.21794  27 22 5 
Korea  -0.64979185  -0.62946  29 29 0 
Australia  -0.14384029 0.230298  20  9  11 
New Zealand  -0.14965797  0.064921  23 15 8 
IDA  0.435717856 0.303249  4 6 -2 
IDB Special   -0.00732    16   
AfDF  0.128078683 0.209923  10 12 -2 
EC  0.017875259 0.268779 14  8  6 
GFATM  0.376800282 0.344303  5 4 1 
GAVI  0.213205015 -0.00902 8  17  -9 
UN (Select 





Figure 9: Overall rankings, 2009 
 


















































Overall QuODA versus Health QuODA, 2009 
 
Table 5: Comparing donors across common indicators, overall versus health 
QuODA6  
  QuODA Rank  QuODAH Rank Change 
Maximizing Efficiency, 2009          
Austria -0.2647  23  -1.07439  30  -7 
Belgium -0.1475  19  0.078388  14  5 
Denmark 0.1972  7  0.797818  2  5 
France 0.069  10  -0.31681  21  -11 
Germany -0.8554  29  -0.47782  26  3 
Italy -0.0367  14  -0.22218  19  -5 
Netherlands -0.1057  17  0.943481  1  16 
Norway -0.2713  24  0.458066  6  18 
Portugal 0.0391  11  0.334144  9  2 
Sweden -0.0396  15  0.31965  10  5 
Switzerland -0.1353  18  0.357566  8  10 
United Kingdom  0.1791  8  0.18788  12  -4 
Finland -0.0192  13  -0.12642  18  -5 
Ireland 0.342  5  0.506243  5  0 
Luxembourg 0.1134  9  0.563188  4  5 
Greece -0.5621  26  -0.81851  29  -3 
Spain -0.3097  25  -0.32485  22  3 
Canada -0.2621  22  -0.33921  23  -1 
USA -0.7103  28  0.063729  16  12 
Japan 0.0214  12  -0.63241  27  -15 
Korea -0.6455  27  -0.73004  28  -1 
Australia -0.2515  21  -0.38579  25  -4 
New Zealand  0.2017  6  0.363273  7  -1 
IDA 0.5277  4  0.307994  11  -7 
IDB Special  0.5479  3  0.070886  15  -12 
AfDF 1.1519  1  0.739097  3  -2 
EC -0.0723  16  -0.23805  20  -4 
GFATM 0.5774  2  0.104035  13  -11 
GAVI       -0.03537  17    
UN (Select Agencies)  -0.1776  20  -0.37858  24  -4 
          
                                                      
6 Rankings in this section rely on average scores across indicators/dimensions that are only common in both 
original and health QuODA indexes.   
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  QuODA Rank  QuODAH Rank Change 
Reducing Burden, 2009   
Austria 0.0946  10  -0.75849  29  -19 
Belgium -0.1832  20  -0.3422  23  -3 
Denmark -0.0563  16  -0.04994  15  1 
France -0.1724  19  -0.35294  24  -5 
Germany -0.3458  22  -0.63476  27  -5 
Italy 0.1718  8  -0.55281  25  -17 
Netherlands 0.0019  13  0.318654  10  3 
Norway -0.5533  25  -0.32441  21  4 
Portugal 0.3322  6  -0.32507  22  -16 
Sweden -0.0315  14  -0.06602  16  -2 
Switzerland -0.7013  27  -0.2272  19  8 
United Kingdom  0.0583  11  0.350489  9  2 
Finland 0.0087  12  -0.0214  14  -2 
Ireland -0.1594  18  -0.20862  18  0 
Luxembourg -0.0559  15  0.182752  11  4 
Greece -0.4828  23  -0.76142  30  -7 
Spain -0.4868  24  -0.12138  17  7 
Canada -0.2223  21  0.742858  5  16 
USA -0.7105  28  -0.26469  20  8 
Japan -0.1382  17  0.353239  7  10 
Korea -0.6551  26  -0.68132  28  -2 
Australia 0.1639  9  1.001409  2  7 
New Zealand  1.0037  1  0.962454  3  -2 
IDA 0.9802  2  0.912352  4  -2 
IDB Special  0.2428  7  0.351292  8  -1 
AfDF 0.8463  3  0.091233  13  -10 
EC 0.346  5  0.447319  6  -1 
GFATM 0.5938  4  1.030607  1  3 
GAVI       0.121235  12    
UN (Select Agencies)  -0.766  29  -0.57962  26  3 
          
Transparency and Learning, 2009  
Austria -0.3432  22  0.110229  15  7 
Belgium -0.9749  29  -0.86291  30  -1 
Denmark -0.1014  20  0.21956  11  9 
France -0.525  26  -0.73571  28  -2 
Germany 0.0404  15  0.285035  8  7 
Italy -0.726  27  -0.18532  22  5 
Netherlands 0.0107  16  0.297106  7  9 
Norway 0.2065  10  0.202386  12  -2  
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  QuODA Rank  QuODAH Rank Change 
Portugal -0.4994  25  -0.31218  24  1 
Sweden 0.408  8  0.233639  10  -2 
Switzerland -0.0906  19  -0.15188  21  -2 
United Kingdom  0.5659  5  0.787005  1  4 
Finland 0.5816  4  0.375666  5  -1 
Ireland 0.4541  7  0.50217  3  4 
Luxembourg -0.8712  28  -0.75882  29  -1 
Greece -0.3699  23  -0.31549  26  -3 
Spain -0.1146  21  -0.12744  20  1 
Canada 0.0422  14  -0.08797  19  -5 
USA 0.1505  12  0.369038  6  6 
Japan 0.1191  13  0.031313  16  -3 
Korea -0.0356  18  -0.24913  23  -5 
Australia 0.2232  9  0.160472  13  -4 
New Zealand  0.1904  11  0.011375  17  -6 
IDA 1.0215  1  0.430432  4  -3 
IDB Special  -0.426  24  -0.51306  27  -3 
AfDF 0.5481  6  -0.31495  25  -19 
EC 0.6343  3  0.545457  2  1 
GFATM 0.7966  2  0.126635  14  -12 
GAVI       -0.07296  18    
UN (Select Agencies)  -0.0001  17  0.258846  9  8 
 
We compare overall QuODA and health QuODA across common indicators, by looking at 
the means of raw indicators. We also correlate common indicators between overall and 
health QuODA 2009, finding that the highest correlation is between the transparency and 
learning indicators (0.7732), and the lowest correlation is between the maximizing and 
efficiency indicators (0.5491). (See correlation matrices, table A7.) 
  Maximizing Efficiency: Health aid fares worse in allocating to poor countries 
compared to overall aid. Health aid also goes to less well-governed countries. More 
of health aid makes it to recipients’ budgets than other sectors; as 79% of it is strict 
CPA, compared to 41% of all aid. It is also more focused, and less tied, than overall 
aid: countries that give overall aid through a multitude of agencies, such as the 
United States, fare better in this indicator than they do in overall QuODA because 
they channel health aid through few large agencies – such as USAID/PEPFAR in 
the case of the United States.  
  Reducing Burden: Health aid has more significant relationships compared to 
overall aid, but it’s more fragmented across donor agencies. It also has a smaller 
median project size, and less of it goes through multilateral channels.  
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  Transparency and Learning: We find that health aid is less transparent than 
overall aid – sector-level data tends to be less consistent and detailed compared to 
overall data. While health aid is better in terms of the reporting of commitments to 
the DAC database, project descriptions are less detailed. Health aid also goes to 
partners with worse M&E frameworks, which is a problem given the need for 
tracking for results and impact.    
Box 5. Multilaterals, innovative financing and health aid 
The scaling of health aid corresponded with the establishment of two international 
financing mechanisms: GAVI Alliance for immunization, and the Global Fund to fight 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria. These funders differ from traditional donors in the sense that 
they are public-private partnerships which are financial instruments and not 
implementers. Both of these organizations defend transparency and accountability as 
their primary principles, and seek to mitigate volatility through innovative, specialized 
longer-term funding windows. GAVI, for example, features Advance Market 
Commitments for pneumonia, as well as the International Finance Facility for 
Immunization (IFFIm), both of which have accelerated the introduction and uptake of 
new and underutilized vaccines. 
These differences from traditional donors should work in favor or aid effectiveness, 
thus, it is important to see how they perform in our indicators. Overall, we see that 
while the Global Fund is ranked above average in the 4
th place, and GAVI is below 
average at 17
th. In maximizing efficiency, the Global Fund is ranked 11
th and GAVI is 
ranked 14
th – again, both are above average. GAVI performs particularly worse in 
fostering institutions, due to the fact that they work with countries which lack health 
plans. Both organizations do well in the reducing burden category, with the Global Fund 
ranking first and GAVI ranking 9
th – a promising result, showing that such multilateral 
initiatives with innovative financing mechanisms do indeed reduce the burden on 
recipient countries. A rather disturbing result is in the transparency and learning 
category: while both organizations espouse principles of transparency and 
accountability, they both rank below average. 
Given these results, both organizations need to be more rigorous about holding 
themselves up to their commitments on transparency and learning; focusing on the 
effectiveness of results instead of inputs. This proves to be more important given the 











Recipient-level analysis for aid dependent countries 
There are many countries that rely on external financing for a high share of their public 
health budget. We have identified the countries that finance more than 20% of their health 
budget through aid, and ran 6 of our aid effectiveness measures for these countries – we 
omitted the transparency and learning indicators from this analysis, and looked instead at 
maximizing efficiency and reducing burden measures.7  
Our results are somewhat encouraging (see table A8): We find that the sample of aid-
dependent recipients receive more untied aid, more strict CPA, and suffer from less 
fragmented aid. The median project size in these countries is also larger. However, aid 
relationships are less significant between aid-dependent nations, and these nations receive 
much less through multilateral channels (11% for aid-dependent, versus 18% overall 
average). 
   
                                                      
7 The countries included in this analysis are: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Eritrea, Tanzania, Rwanda, Liberia, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Zambia, Haiti, 
Kenya, Niger, Sudan, Lesotho, Djibouti, Madagascar, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda 
and Sierra Leone.   
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Recommendations and conclusion 
Recommendation 1: Need for continued progress across indicators 
In the previous section – as well as in appendix 2 – we analyzed how donors fare within each 
indicator and dimension. Our analysis is based on the inherent assumption that effective 
health aid can save lives, and the 23 indicators in this index constitute a proxy for tracking 
aid effectiveness. Given this, we believe that it is possible to track and compare progress 
across different periods using our indicators; as we did between 2008 and 2009. Through this 
exercise, we also highlight the relevant strengths and weaknesses of each donor. 
Here, however, it is important to discuss a crucial point: the indicators are scored relative to 
the average, as for almost all indicators it is not possible to declare a best-practice level. This 
relies on the assumption that the donors below average can increase their aid effectiveness if 
they go above average. Similarly, maximizing overall performance as opposed to individual 
performance would be more relevant: currently, our only way to determine if overall 
efficiency (or burden on recipients, or transparency) goes up or down is to compare raw 
scores across years, which we do on table A2. It is, again, not possible to establish an optimal 
level of aggregate performance.  
Despite these limitations, the indicators forming our index have one point in common: 
performing better in them would translate into better aid, which, ideally, translates into 
better development results, and those who perform worse should improve their 
performance, as measured in raw scores, across these indicators. Donors could also use these 
rankings to capitalize on their comparative advantages, as for most donors, their rankings are 
very different across every dimension.  
Recommendation 2: Need for more and better aid effectiveness data 
Our biggest difficulty while constructing this index was the lack of health sector specific data 
pertaining to aid effectiveness. Information on many initiatives, such as sector wide 
approaches and budget support, remain on the qualitative side; hence it was not possible for 
us to quantify these efforts. Similarly, we were not able to look into harmonization and 
predictability, measures which were tracked through the Paris Declaration Monitoring 
Survey. Hence, the results we present here are only a part of the aid effectiveness in health: if 
we had the chance, we would have included data on the following categories, which are at 
least as important as the measures we have included: 
  Aid predictability and volatility 
  Harmonization and coordination: avoidance of parallel project implementation units 
  Budget support and fungibility 
  Results-based financing  
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  Investment in health systems strengthening 
Including sector-level questions in the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey would be an 
efficient and beneficial way of tracking donor performance on health aid effectiveness. 
Further, it is important to transition from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness, 
and connecting aid practices with results achieved on the field: certain studies we cite in our 
first section point out to the correlation between aid and results, but donors do not track, or 
quantify, the impact of their aid dollars on improving various measurable health outcomes 
such as mortality, vaccination rates or deaths averted. Thus, measurement, monitoring and 
evaluation practices should be improved across the board. 
Recommendation 3: Need for more policy impact evaluations 
A major difficulty in constructing a valid indicator of health aid quality is that the 
relationship between each indicator and/or dimension and the outcomes is unclear and 
unproven empirically. If aid effectiveness measures matter -if they are more than common 
sense- we should be able to show that they matter for program results. However, such 
evaluations would require heroic and convoluted assumptions; for example, it is difficult to 
assess how a small aid-funded technical assistance program provided in five countries can be 
compared to a large aid-funded commodity procurement. Both are inputs into a production 
function of a given health service that has both a supply and demand-side. As a result, while 
we believe that it is useful to continue to track aid effectiveness goals just because world 
leaders agreed that these measures were important, ultimately more attention should be paid 
to impact evaluation that would allow country governments and donors to assess best 
technical assistance modalities, best procurement mechanisms and best health coverage and 
outcomes.  
Conclusion: Going Forward 
In this paper, we build an index that quantifies aid effectiveness in health, an exercise that 
should be useful given the increase (and potential decrease) in both the scale and scope of 
health aid. We replicate Birdsall and Kharas' QuODA where possible, and add various 
indicators of our own.  
There is mixed progress from 2008 to 2009: while progress has been made in some 
dimensions, such as untying aid, supporting global public good facilities, and establishing 
more significant aid relationships, donors fared worse in certain very important categories 
such as allocation according to disease burden and fragmentation across agencies. We also 
see mixed results as we compare overall aid effectiveness to health aid effectiveness: while 
the health aid sector seems more focused and concentrated, it does less well in allocating to 
poor or well-governed countries.   
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It is, once again, very important to stress the caveats involved in our analysis: while we rank 
donors in four dimensions, and an overall dimension, these rankings should be taken with a 
grain of salt. We are publishing all of our data, code and results, so our readers can 
implement the weights they want or omit certain indicators and re-rank donors.  
In the end, we see that what we leave out is as significant as what we include: every index, or 
ranking, omits crucial indicators, but in our case it could be debated that what we leave out is 
even more significant than what we include. Yet, given all these caveats, our principal aim is 
to generate a discussion over quantitative sector-level aid effectiveness measures, and let 
recipients hold donor agencies accountable.  
The Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in November 2011, addressed 
certain issues such as transparency, aid in fragile states and the emergence of new donors, yet 
failed to address others such as the shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness 
(results). Effective health aid, as we have pointed out repeatedly in this paper, saves lives, 
and as donor funding flat lines and decreases, commitment to better outcomes must be 
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Appendix 1: Descriptions of Indicators 
Dimension 1: Maximizing Efficiency 
ME1. Share of allocation to poor countries  
Generally, poorer countries spend least on health per capita, yet higher spending levels are 
closely connected with health improvements worldwide. A study in the United States finds 
that mortality fell by between 1.1 and 6.9% for every 10% increase in public spending (Mays 
and Smith 2011), while a cross-country study in developing countries found that increased 
health expenditures are associated with better outcomes in Africa, especially on infant and 
child mortality (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2007). Similarly, a WHO review (2002) found a 
positive relationship between health-adjusted life expectancy and health spending (Pouillier 
et al 2002). This literature –while far from definitive- suggests that countries with less 
capacity to spend on health should receive more health aid. By including the indicator “share 
of donor allocation to poor countries”, we reward donors that direct more of their resources 
to poorer countries, thus creating the conditions for “better bang-for-the-buck” for health 
aid. 
We use per capita national income as a measure of poverty instead of per capita public 
spending on health, since we believe that per capita income is a more objective measure of 
the funding and administrative capacity of countries given concerns that health aid might be 
fungible. In addition, GDP per capita and public spending on health are highly correlated, 
essentially measuring the same thing. 
As in QuODA (2010), we took the logarithm of per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing 
power parity (CGDP) to emphasize changes at the lower end of the spectrum. We weigh net 
CPA with the logarithm of CGDP. Hence, we measure the true orientation of donors with 
respect to need. 
The donors that allocate most consistently with income per capita are Belgium, Ireland, 
AfDF, Norway and GAVI. The countries that fare worst in this category are France, 
Portugal, Korea, IDB and Spain. Allocation rules and eligibility requirements play a clear role 
in donor performance on this measure. For example, only countries with per capita incomes 
below US$1,500 per year are eligible for GAVI assistance. Similarly, the IDB –as a demand-
based lending institution, limited to funding in Latin America and the Caribbean- will be 
unlikely to preferentially allocate to the globally worst-off. 














Source: OECD CRS Database (2009); IMF World Economic Outlook (2011)  
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ME2. Share of allocation to countries with high burden of disease  
The most basic objective of health aid is to improve health. Yet a 2007 study finds that 90% 
of the global disease burden in developing countries receives only 12% of global health 
spending (Dodd et al 2007). Non-communicable diseases, for example, constituted 0.5% of 
all health aid in 2008, while representing over two-thirds of global disease burden (WHO 
2010). A study by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) shows that –in 
the aggregate- development assistance for health is negatively correlated with total burden of 
disease (measured as disability-adjusted life years – DALY). The lack of correlation overall 
results in very different allocation amounts per case of disease; for example, Eastern 
European countries, such as Bulgaria and Serbia, receive more than $100 per case of 
tuberculosis, whereas countries with higher burden such as Uganda and Zimbabwe receive 
less than $5 per case (IHME 2011)  
We calculate this indicator using the same methodology as ME1, looking to see whether 
countries allocate aid preferentially to countries with the largest disease burdens. We define 
disease burden as DALYs, disability adjusted life years, which measures the number of years 
lost due to disability, early death, or poor health; measuring years of healthy life lost (WHO 
2008). The latest figures for this measure are from the World Health Organization’s 2008 
report, using data from 2004.  
Donors which perform best on this measure are the United Kingdom, IDA, Germany, 
Global Fund and GAVI, and those which perform worst are IDB, France, New Zealand, 
Portugal and Greece. 














Source: OECD CRS Database (2009); IHME DAH Disease Burden Database (2010)8 
ME3. Focus/specialization by recipient country 
Many studies suggest that donor proliferation –donor agencies that disperse their aid budget 
among a portfolio of potential recipients in lieu of concentrating more significant resources 
in a few countries- dilutes the impact of aid. There are currently over 100 partnerships in 
health, and many donors have small aid programs in a multitude of countries (Dodd et al 
2007). Roodman (2006) shows that there are economies of scale in the provision of aid that 
could be exploited given the sunk costs associated with each project as well as the scarcity of 
resources and institutions in the recipient countries. Knack and Rahman (2004) analyze 
trends of donor proliferation in recipient countries, showing that proliferation has increased 
since 1975. An analysis by Kharas (2009) shows that smaller and poorer countries tend to 
                                                      
8 CDALY: Per capita DALY. DALY data comes from latest available data; from 2004.  
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suffer from higher fragmentation, and countries with high aid per capita are less fragmented. 
Social sectors, such as health, tend to suffer from higher fragmentation and less significant 
aid relationships: 51% of partnerships tend to be significant, and 88% of aid goes to 
significant recipients (OECD 2010).9 
Donors could enhance their impact by establishing more significant relationships with fewer 
countries. We use the same methodology to calculate ME3 as was used in the original 
QuODA; by calculating each donor’s revealed comparative advantage (RCA) defined as the 
concentration of that donor’s aid in a recipient country. We compare the ratio of a donor’s 
health aid in a partner country relative to the cumulative aid to that partner, and the donor’s 
total aid flows to all its partner countries relative to total global health aid. When this 
indicator exceeds 1, the donor is considered to have an RCA in the recipient country. When 
donors provide small amounts of aid to many countries, or to countries which receive high 
amounts of aid, their RCA decreases. 
Donors which give the majority of their aid to a smaller number of countries fare better in 
this category, such as IDB, Portugal and New Zealand. Countries that have less significant 
aid relationships, such as Norway, Japan and the UN Agencies fare worst in this category. 
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Where CPA is gross CPA. 
Source: OECD CRS Database (2009) 
ME4. Share of allocation to well-governed countries 
The relationship between effective aid and good governance is well documented, to the 
extent that aid organizations such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) integrate 
governance as a selection criterion. Many articles point to a strong relationship between aid 
effectiveness and governance quality (see Burnside & Dollar 2000, Bearce 2009). The 
original QuODA includes a share of allocation to well-governed countries, as a function of 
country programmable aid weighted by the Kaufmann and Penciakova (2010) quality of 
governance index, finding that smaller donors have a good governance orientation. Similarly, 
                                                      
9 Significant relationships are defined as the number of donors who are involved in the group of donors that 
together disburse 90% of total aid to the recipient (OECD 2010)  
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an analysis by Fielding (2011) finds that health aid effectiveness is sensitive to corruption, 
governance quality and political rights.  
However, there is also evidence that the same relationship does not necessarily hold for 
health aid: Dietrich (2011) finds that countries such as Bangladesh and Mali, which are not 
necessarily well-governed, have efficiently managed the DAH they receive. Dietrich 
attributes this efficiency to donors behaving differently in weak governance countries, 
anticipating weak institutions and focusing on sector-specific programs. Immunization 
coverage in weak governance countries from 1990-2004 supports this argument; corrupt 
governments may not seek rents in the health sector, and use the assistance to provide 
minimal coverage. Dietrich posits that corrupt countries use health aid efficiently as to please 
donors and show them progress, so that they can seek rents in more profitable sectors such 
as infrastructure.  
Another argument for not including governance as a determinant of aid effectiveness in 
health comes from the experience of GAVI and the Global Fund, which are evaluated in 
this index: these countries work in both low- and middle-income countries with low 
governance quality, and yet they have managed to be efficient in these settings. The Global 
Fund has invested ~US$5 billion from 2002-2009 in 41 fragile states, and most of these 
grants have been evaluated to perform well (Bornemisza et al 2010).  
We include an indicator that captures the correlation of aid with good governance in 
recipient countries, but given the mixed evidence, this measure’s significance should be taken 
with a grain of salt. We weight the strict CPA of each donor with the quality of governance 
of its partner countries. GAVI performs the worst in this category, not surprising given that 
GAVI gives to countries with an average income below $1,500, most of which are also 
fragile, weak governance countries. The Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark perform best in 
this category. 
















Source: OECD CRS Database (2009); Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009 
ME5. Share of strict country programmable aid 
As discussed in part 2, the Development Assistance Committee defines country 
programmable aid as ODA minus debt relief, humanitarian aid, food aid, administrative 
costs and imputed student costs. CPA is useful in the sense that it excludes spending that is 
inherently unpredictable, entails no flows to the recipient country or is not discussed 
between the main donor agency and recipient governments (Benn and Steensen 2010). Strict 
CPA constituted 79% of cumulative health CPA in 2008. CPA is particularly useful for 
comparing in-country financial impact across donors, as well as concentration across and  
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within countries and agencies: it captures programmable development projects by excluding 
emergency situations.  
Since all health ODA is automatically CPA, we use ODA to calculate the indicators 
throughout this report. However, not all health CPA is strict CPA, which subtracts free 
standing technical cooperation (FTC) and interest payments from ODA. FTC is defined as 
the provision of resources for building up general national capacity without reference to the 
implementation of specific investment projects. We believe that taking out FTC and interest 
payments, which do not include actual transfers of funds into partner countries, gives an 
accurate representation of the share of aid donors allocate to support programs and projects 
directly.10 
Thus, we calculate the share of strict health sector CPA over gross CPA. We see that 
multilaterals, such as IDB Special, GAVI, Global Fund and UN Agencies perform best in 
this category, and donor countries such as Australia, Greece and Canada perform worst.  
Analysis based on: sCPAd/ grossCPAd 
Source: OECD CRS Database (2009) 
ME6. Share of untied aid 
The practice of tying aid – conditioning it to the procurement of goods and services from 
suppliers in the donor country – has long been condemned, and the share of tied aid has 
steadily been going down. Untying aid is efficient for various reasons: it sustains resource 
transfer efficiency, greater flexibility within agency programming, as well as greater 
responsibility and ownership for recipient partner countries. A comprehensive survey of five 
donors who were untying aid after 2001 (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and 
Switzerland) shows favorable results for untying aid, as it brings support to country 
institutions and passes responsibility for disbursement from donors to country partners and 
civil society organizations (Clay et al 2008). About 84% of total health aid in 2006 was 
untied; in 2009, this went up to 89% (CRS 2009).  
CRS reports untied aid in two different categories: partially untied, and untied. We give 
untied aid a weight of 1, and partially untied aid a weight of 0.5. We see that many of the 
larger donors have almost 100% untied aid: Norway, Netherlands and United Kingdom 
untied all their health aid; 97% of United States’ health is untied. On the other hand, smaller 
aid programs fared worse, with Austria untying 21% of its aid and Korea untying only 8%. 
Analysis based on: (Untied aidd) + 0.5*(Partially tied aidd) / Total bilateral aidd 
Source: OECD CRS Database (2009) 
                                                      
10 FTC’s definition: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6023  
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ME7. Support of selected global public good facilities (WHO, GAVI, UNICEF, 
Global Fund, PAHO) 
Many issues in health, such as communicable disease control and prevention, are beyond a 
single country’s reach, and require cooperation regionally and globally to achieve results. 
Global public goods in health refer to programs, policies and services that have a global 
impact on health, although the distribution of benefits may be unevenly perceived across 
countries; they are non-excludable and depend on the contribution of many states. In today’s 
globalizing world, borders are becoming increasingly porous and many global public bads – 
especially in health – are moving beyond one single country’s realm (Kaul and Faust 2001). 
Drug resistance, disease elimination, disease surveillance, research and development, and 
standardized data are examples of global public good issues in health. Humanitarian 
concerns have been the main basis for international collaboration in health in the past, yet 
countries can benefit from working together to resolve the major global health challenges of 
the day. As the world becomes more integrated and interdependent, countries are exposed to 
health problems originating beyond their borders. Furthermore, it is easier to benefit from 
economies of scale in aspects such as research, public-private partnerships for vaccine and 
drug creation, as well as disease elimination/eradication: efficiency gains are immense. 
The agencies that support GPG in health include the standard-setting and epidemiological 
surveillance agencies such as WHO and PAHO, as well as funding agencies that directly 
support the control and prevention of communicable diseases such as the GAVI Alliance for 
vaccine preventable diseases and the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. 
In the context of sustaining lower prices and encouraging bulk purchasing, PAHO and 
GAVI have been very effective in increasing immunization rates in the low-income and 
lower-middle income countries. Similarly, through its grants and loans, the Global Fund was 
able to increase prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria in both low-
income and middle-income contexts. 
We include support to five institutions that provide or fund global public goods as a share of 
total donor ODA. We reward donors which give the highest share of their total ODA – 
including all sectors – to these donors, as contributions to global public good facilities come 
out of donors’ total aid budget.  
We find that Norway, Italy and the Netherlands contribute most as a share of total ODA to 
global public good facilities. Portugal, Greece and Austria give a very small share of their 
total ODA to these facilities. 
Analysis based on: (total contributions to 5 facilitiesd)/totalODA 





Dimension 2: Fostering Institutions 
FI1. Share of aid to countries with national health plans 
As recipient governments identify their priorities through national health plans, donors 
should be able to provide support more aligned with national priorities. The World Health 
Organization actively supports the development of National Health Policies, Strategies and 
Plans (NHP) through technical cooperation and international policy frameworks (WHO 
2010). A framework approved by the WHO in early 2011 outlines certain elements for NHP, 
such as focusing on MDGs, public health, including primary health care reforms as well as 
equity and universal coverage. In emphasizing NHP as the epicenter of policy dialogue, the 
WHO hopes that countries achieve coherence between aid agencies as well as recipient 
countries. Similarly, UNICEF has called for the improvement of national health plans in 
Africa, and together with the World Health Organization established “Harmonization for 
Health in Africa” in order to invest in them.  
In this indicator, we look at the World Health Organization’s data on all countries regarding 
health plans: an overall National Health Plan, a Country Multi Year Plan for Immunization, 
and plans for TB, HIV/AIDS, Reproductive Health, Maternal Health and Child Health. We 
give 1 point to each plan, and in the end develop a score out of seven. We reward donors 
that give to countries with “more” health plans (higher scores) by weighing their CPA by the 
log of the number of health plans.  
While recognizing the absurdity of counting the number of plans as a measure of support to 
institutions, given the uncertain relationship between plans, their quality and actual budgets 
and implementation, the presence or not of NHP has thus far been the main means of 
tracking progress in the development of national ownership in the health sector (WHO, 
2011b). Within the International Health Partnership and the Health Systems Funding 
Platform countries, the WHO is carrying out join assessments of the quality of National 
Health Plans and their monitoring and evaluation arrangements (Glassman and Savedoff 
2011); results of these assessments have not been made public. 
The IDB Special Fund outperforms all donors in this measure, since it concentrates its aid in 
Latin American countries, all of which have multiple health plans. Norway and Finland also 
fare well in this category. Spain, New Zealand and Korea rank last.  


















FI2. Support to essential health metrics 
Effective health spending and by extension health aid can only be measured and managed 
effectively if complete, high quality data for health decision-making is available. Vital 
statistics, household health surveys, census data, birth and death registration, disease 
surveillance, utilization and spending data, are essential building blocks of the health system. 
However, developing countries frequently lack such data, which makes management, 
improvement and accountability of health systems insurmountably difficult. Recently, 
numerous global health agencies have made calls to ensure data availability (Chan et al 2010). 
Eight agencies working in global health, including the WHO, GAVI, Global Fund, World 
Bank and UNICEF, have suggested the development of common data architecture, the 
strengthening of performance monitoring and evaluation, as well as increased data access 
and use. The Director-General of the World Health Organization deemed the availability of 
vital statistics to be “badly needed,” and that “the United Nations Commission on 
Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health have given "high 
priority to the establishment of badly needed information systems for the registration of 
births, deaths and cause of deaths" (WHO 2011). 
Parallel to this, the WHO has established the Health Metrics Network, a partnership 
supporting the availability of vital statistics and minimum health information systems in 
developing countries. Similarly, PARIS21 (The Partnership in Statistics for Development in 
the 21st Century), is a global partnership of statisticians aiming to promote, influence and 
facilitate statistical capacity development. In this indicator, we look to see if a donor agency 
contributes actively to statistical capacity-building. Our data sources are PARIS21 members, 
Health Metrics Network members, and donor agency websites. We find that most countries 
have at least one project supporting essential health metrics.  
Analysis based on  
Presence of keywords “health metrics, demographics, statistics, capacity, surveillance, 
accounts, surveys” in the long description field of OECD CRS database; agency websites 
used to cross-check. Dummy variable; 1 if keywords present, 0 if not. 
Source: OECD CRS Database (2009); donor agency websites 
Dimension 3: Reducing Burden 
RB1. Significance of aid relationships 
As described in ME3, aid proliferation significantly increases the burden on recipients, as 
administrative costs associated with each development program reduce the received value of 
aid to recipients. Roodman (2006) describes the high costs of managing many small aid 
projects that lead to diminishing marginal effectiveness. Knack and Rahman (2007) find that 
these costs also lead to the poaching of highly qualified civil servants and that fragmentation  
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is associated with decreased bureaucratic quality of recipients. An OECD report (2010) on 
fragmentation in sectoral aid finds that 51% of partnerships are significant, and 88% of aid 
goes to significant recipients in health. The same report highlights data from 2007, which 
shows that smaller donors fare worse than larger donors: Austria, Finland, Greece and 
UNDP had the least significant relationships (Frot and Santiso 2010). Fragmentation is more 
common in social sectors, such as health, where smaller scales of investment are needed as 
opposed to infrastructure projects, which makes coordination among donors harder. About 
46% of donors collectively represented less than 10% of sectoral aid in 2007, which leads to 
a very high level of fragmentation in the health sector (Frot and Santiso 2010)  
As in original QuODA, we measure the significance of aid relationships by estimating the 
marginal contribution of each donor to its partner countries’ administrative costs. Recipient 
countries must deal with multiple donors, so it stands to reason that the administrative cost 
per dollar received is inversely proportional to the concentration of aid across all donors in a 
given recipient country. We then take a weighted average of the donor’s contribution to all 
recipients. The smaller the contribution, the higher the donor’s score on this measure, thus 
rewarding the significance of a donor’s aid relationship in a given country.  
The concentration of aid is defined as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) – usually 
used to measure competition in a given market by looking at firms’ market shares – and the 
marginal contribution of donors to recipients’ HHI is the sum across partners of the squared 
share of donor aid to a partner weighted by the donor’s total gross ODA.  
Donors who have significant aid relationships with their partners fare better in this category 
such as Portugal, Australia and New Zealand. Donors with less significant aid relationships, 
such as Denmark, AfDF and Ireland, fare worse. 



















Source: OECD CRS Database (2009) 
RB2. Fragmentation across donor agencies 
Many of the larger donors deliver aid through many agencies, and reducing the number of 
donor-partner relationships as well as the administrative burdens associated with them would 
make aid more effective: instead of interacting with a single donor agency providing a single 
service, recipients often have to interact with multiple agencies for the same service. An 
OECD report shows that there are 3,700 aid relationships between 151 aid recipients & 46 
largest donors, resulting in “too little aid from too many donors” (OECD 2009). Some 
donors deliver aid through multiple agencies affiliated with their governments, which 
increases the administrative burden for both donors and recipients. The United States, for 
example, delivers aid through more than 50 bureaucratic organizations, 11 of which give 
health aid (Brainard 2007). Over the past decade, the number of delivery mechanisms and  
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donors in global health has expanded rapidly: there are now more than 100 global 
partnerships in health sector alone, with 80% of donors providing only 10% of total 
assistance (Action for Global Health 2011).  
We calculate the concentration of aid delivery using the HHI constructed in RB1. In this 
case, if a donor delivered aid through one agency, its HHI is equal to one, and as the number 
of agencies increase, the share of each individual agency decreases & HHI approaches zero. 
We also did not treat aid delivered through multilateral donors as an additional channel – so 
aid channeled through a multilateral but coming through different agencies would be 
counted as being disbursed through a single agency channel. 
Donors that disburse aid through few agencies, such as Denmark, Netherlands and Finland, 
fare better in this category; as opposed to the UN Agencies, France and Greece, which 
deliver smaller amounts of aid through individual agencies. 














Source: OECD CRS Database (2009) 
RB3. Median project size 
Since every aid project has high fixed costs, the multitude of small projects decreases the 
value of aid. Literature shows that funding larger projects increases aid effectiveness; the 
burden per dollar is larger for the smaller project (Roodman 2006). Further, health aid 
suffers from extreme fragmentation: there were 18.654 projects and 27,900 activities in 2009, 
with the average size of $496,000.11 
In this indicator, we look at the median health aid project size. We use the median rather 
than the mean to control for the multitude of small projects in the CRS database. The 
Global Fund, IDA and the European Commission have the highest median project sizes, as 
opposed to Austria, Portugal and Sweden, which have the lowest. 
Analysis based on log[median commitment size of projects] 
Source: OECD CRS Database (2009) 
RB4. Share of aid that goes through multilateral channels 
The Paris Declaration encourages donors to reduce transaction costs by delegating aid to 
donors which have expertise in partner countries. Using multilateral channels decreases 
                                                      
11 The number here refers to activities, which is the unit of measurement in the CRS. An activity is a one 
line item, but a project can consist of many activities. In this indicator, however, our unit of measurement is 
projects, and we have tried to collapse activities into projects.   
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coordination and harmonization costs, thus reducing the burden on recipient countries and 
making aid more effective. Multilateral channels are also less affected by political issues that 
affect health aid.  
In this indicator, we measure the share of CPA by each donor that is channeled through 
multilateral channels; which mostly includes NGOs and public-private partnerships. Here, 
we exclude core aid to multilaterals, which, by definition, is not sectoral. It is important to 
note that many activities do not indicate their channel type, which reduces the significance of 
this indicator. 
We find that Canada, Japan and Australia channel the highest share of their aid through 
multilaterals. France and Portugal fare worst in this indicator, as they do not channel any of 
their aid through multilaterals.  
Analysis based on Multilateral CPAd / Total CPAd  
Source: OECD CRS Database (2009) 
RB5. IHP+ membership 
The International Health Partnership (IHP+) is a group of partners who seek to implement 
Paris and Accra principles on aid effectiveness in the context of improving health services 
and outcomes. It was established to combat with the major problems of global health 
agenda: inadequate progress towards MDGs, unaddressed health system constraints, 
insufficient investment in health, unpredictable international funding, and inefficient support 
to countries (IHP+ 2009). 
IHP+ seeks to reduce burden on developing countries by encouraging them to focus on 
implementing the national health strategy, as well as helping them sustain a better use of 
existing funds through improved coordination and increased investment in national health 
strategies, and increasing government leadership in sector coordination. IHP+ encourages 
increased support for a national health plan through support to national sector planning 
processes, encouraging joint assessment of strengths and weaknesses of national plans, 
tracking plan implementation and monitoring progress against commitments. IHP+’s main 
toolkit is the Joint Assessment of National Strategies (JANS), which is a shared approach to 
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a national strategy. By early 2011 give developing 
countries (Nepal, Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana and Vietnam) have completed this process, and 
other countries are increasingly using this process to streamline their national health plans. 
Launched in September 2007, IHP+ has 52 members, including donor/partner countries, 
civil society organizations and multilateral organizations. 25 members of IHP+ (15 of which 
are donor organizations) are also participants to the IHP+ Results process, which hopes to 




We include membership to IHP+ as a proxy for harmonization and coordination efforts 
(See Box 1). 
Analysis based on: IHP+ Membership: YES or NO 
Source: IHP+ Website  
Dimension 4: Transparency and Learning 
TL1a & TL1b. IATI membership / Implementation of IATI data reporting standards 
IATI helps donors implement the transparency commitments made at the Accra Agenda for 
Action. Its members commit to “the IATI standard,” which seeks to streamline and facilitate 
data availability. By streamlining data reporting and availability as well as facilitating access to 
data, IATI increases the quality of public information on aid, in turn increasing the 
accountability of donors.  
An estimate shows that while IATI would cost a total of $6m to signatories, it would end up 
saving $7m due to decreasing the duplicate manual reporting of aid information, as well as 
other benefits that would come with increasing aid transparency: increased predictability, by 
itself, could lead to the equivalent of a $1.6b increase in aid, and if the IATI standard were to 
be implemented by all DAC donors this would increase global aid by 2.3% (Collin et al 
2009). 
While IATI currently has 20 signatories, not all donors have implemented these standards 
yet, which is why we include an additional indicator measuring if donors have reported their 
data according to IATI standards or not.  
Analysis based on: IATI membership: yes or no [2009] / Data reported in IATI standard: 
yes or no [2009] 
Source: International Aid Transparency Initiative Website 
TL2. 3ie membership 
Both donor and recipient countries often do not conduct impact evaluations: while billions 
of dollars are spent by donors, few programs benefit from ex post evaluations and empirical 
evidence that would help reallocate funds more efficiently, as well as improve accountability. 
A World Bank report of evaluations in 2000 states that “Despite the billions of dollars spent 
on development assistance each year, there is still very little known about the actual impact 
of projects on the poor,” highlighting the importance of evaluations for accountable and 
efficient aid (Easterly 2006). 
An example to benefits of ex post evaluations can be conditional cash transfer programs, 
which have been rigorously evaluated thanks to the availability of survey data: initially started  
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in Mexico, these programs have sprawled to almost all Latin American countries when it was 
found that they were effective (Bourguignon and Sunderberg 2006). 
A working group convened by the Center for Global Development in 2006 resulted in the 
establishment of the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 3ie. 3ie sponsors in-
depth impact evaluations which rely on the construction of a credible counterfactual, and 
seeks to generate evidence of what works in development, as well as developing both the 
capacity and the culture of producing and using impact evaluations.  
3ie currently has 24 members, most of which are multilateral donors; although various 
countries such as United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden also 
participate in this initiative.  
Analysis based on: Response of YES or NO 
Source: 3ie website 
TL3. Recording of project titles and descriptions 
DAC members commit to providing information about each of their aid projects to the CRS 
database, and they should provide complete records of information regarding the 
descriptions and titles of these projects. The CRS database has fields on sectors, countries, 
regions to which the aid project is targeted, as well as the descriptions of the purpose of 
these projects: the availability of this information would greatly benefit academics, civil 
society organizations, as well as the media, thus increasing accountability. 
We looked at the CRS database to see the average percentage of populated fields by each 
donor: project title, short description and long description. Fourteen donors completed all 
three key fields in health projects: including Austria, USA, Germany and the Global Fund. 
Three donors completed the smallest share, filling out 2/3 of the fields: Belgium, AfDF and 
GAVI.  
Analysis based on: Populated key field entriesd / Total key field entriesd 
Source: OECD CRS (2009) 
TL4. Detail of project descriptions 
Similar to the project titles and descriptions, the detail of project descriptions empowers 
policymakers and civil society organizations by offering more insight into the details of each 
aid project. In the “long description” field of CRS, donors can provide details on the 
purpose and components of each project. We look at the length of these descriptions as a 
proxy for each donor’s project-level activities: some donors simply repeat the project name 
in the long description field, thus longer fields imply more project-level data.   
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We take the logarithm of the average character count, which emphasizes changes at the 
lower level. Although this indicator does not take into account the “quality” of the 
responses, it is the best available replacement for how much information is made available 
by the donors. 
The best performing organizations in this category are IDA, Ireland and the United States. 
AfDF and Korea provided no long descriptions to the CRS.  
Analysis based on: Log (Number of characters in long description entriesd / Number of 
long description entriesd) 
Source: OECD CRS (2009) 
TL5. Reporting of aid delivery channel  
Donors have various channels through which they can disburse aid, and by specifying how 
they channel their support, they enable better tracking of the movement of donor aid flows. 
We use the same methodology used in QuODA, which was borrowed from Development 
Initiatives’ analysis of donor reporting, which constructs a measurement based on the 
information reported by donors to the CRS. Donors report the channel of their support for 
each of their aid projects, and we look at whether they “sufficiently” fill this field or not. On 
average, 83% of projects have reported their channel. Five donors (Portugal, Greece, Korea, 
AfDF and GAVI) reported all their channels, and two donors (IDA and IDB) have not 
reported any of their channels.  
Analysis based on: CRS flows with sufficient reportingd / Total CRS flowsd 
TL6. Completeness of project-level commitment data 
The sector-level DAC database includes aggregate aid flows from donor to partner 
countries, whereas the CRS database tracks project-level spending. In this indicator, we look 
into the discrepancy between the two, as donor countries should accurately report their 
project-level aid. We subtract the ratio of total CPA by donors reported in the project level 
to the total CPA they report in the aggregate level, which scores them on how they report 
their project-level commitment data. 
IDB, Denmark and AfDF perform the best in this category, whereas Sweden and the Global 
Fund have the highest discrepancy between their reporting to the DAC sector-level database 
and the Credit Reporting System. 








Source: OECD DAC database; OECD CRS (2009)  
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TL7. Quality of evaluation policy 
As we discussed in our 3iE indicator, impact evaluations are crucial for health aid 
effectiveness. In this indicator, we are using a methodology developed by the original 
QuODA team to rank countries’ evaluation policies, by evaluating them across 5 indicators 
and seeing if the principal aid agency in each country has the following: 
  0.5 points for having a single policy document 
  0.5 points for describing measures to maximize the independence of evaluations; 
this includes stating that evaluation units report separately from line management or 
that evaluations are primarily led by external researchers 
  0.5 points for stating that all evaluations will be publicly available (as an indication of 
openness/transparency) 
  0.5 points for describing mechanisms to ensure that evaluation findings and 
recommendations will be considered in future planning (as an indication of how 
evaluation contributes to evaluation and learning) 
  0.5 points for clarifying what gets evaluated 
Austria and the United States get all of the possible 2.5 points, while Italy, Luxembourg, 
Greece and Belgium get 0 points. 
Analysis based on: Agency websites; QuODA team scoring of each agency’s evaluation 
policies over an index of 2.5 
Source: Agency websites; evaluation policy documents 
TL8. Aid to partners with good monitoring and evaluation frameworks 
Monitoring and evaluation is especially crucial in allocating health aid more efficiently, as it 
establishes an evidence base for budget and policy decisions. All policy decisions in health 
imply a tradeoff, and the strength of monitoring and evaluation institutions in partner 
countries improves the probability that this money will be allocated more efficiently. In 
order to underline the importance of strengthening M&E frameworks, we looked at the 
most recent World Bank AER (2007), which ranks the M&E frameworks of 62 low and 
lower-middle income countries on a scale of 1 to 5. We define a solid M&E framework as 
one which receives one of the two highest scores in the World Bank rating, and look at the 
share of allocation to countries with good M&E frameworks. We give full credit to top 2 
ratings and partial credit to those with the 3rd highest rating.  
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Donor name Gross ODA Gross CPA Gross sCPA Gross ODA Gross CPA Gross sCPA Gross ODA Gross CPA Gross sCPA Health/Overall Gross ODA Gross CPA Gross sCPA Health/Overall
Austria 1,759.4 218.5 137.7 1,151.9 202.0 111.3 13.6 13.6 7.1 6.20% 10.8 10.8 6.1 5.32%
Belgium 2,437.1 721.5 312.0 2,658.2 774.9 371.2 120.3 120.3 48.2 16.68% 128.0 128.0 64.1 16.52%
Denmark 2,866.6 914.9 867.6 2,845.7 996.5 975.4 95.7 95.7 89.5 10.46% 129.3 129.3 124.2 12.98%
France 12,539.8 3,846.2 2,576.5 14,113.8 3,607.6 2,154.2 120.7 120.7 75.4 3.14% 153.3 153.3 91.5 4.25%
Germany 15,961.2 4,748.7 1,992.1 13,342.3 5,171.6 2,231.7 382.7 382.7 223.9 8.06% 397.7 397.7 240.7 7.69%
Italy 5,096.6 840.4 727.9 3,475.8 595.7 513.0 121.0 121.0 98.8 14.40% 103.0 103.0 87.4 17.30%
Netherlands 7,111.1 2,223.1 2,063.9 6,542.0 1,825.1 1,689.4 272.9 272.9 265.1 12.27% 212.9 212.9 207.6 11.66%
Norway 4,005.8 1,504.0 1,207.2 4,085.9 1,419.1 1,212.6 143.3 143.3 125.2 9.53% 133.1 133.1 117.5 9.38%
Portugal 627.2 298.2 189.8 548.3 234.8 131.6 7.9 7.9 5.4 2.67% 9.3 9.3 7.5 3.95%
Sweden 4,731.7 1,620.1 1,509.2 4,548.3 1,418.4 1,374.4 236.9 236.9 232.8 14.62% 172.9 172.9 169.6 12.19%
Switzerland 2,049.3 626.3 531.0 2,320.1 644.1 600.4 52.7 52.7 51.8 8.42% 58.7 58.7 57.0 9.12%
United Kingdom 11,976.6 4,185.0 3,432.1 11,490.2 4,111.4 3,588.0 851.7 851.7 704.0 20.35% 798.3 798.3 664.5 19.42%
Finland 1,167.7 352.2 181.9 1,290.2 409.8 180.7 33.8 33.8 19.9 9.61% 30.7 30.7 14.6 7.49%
Ireland 1,327.8 558.1 545.4 1,005.9 464.5 460.7 147.0 147.0 143.8 26.33% 117.8 117.8 117.0 25.36%
Luxembourg 414.9 193.6 191.0 414.7 180.0 175.4 56.9 56.9 56.8 29.38% 46.7 46.7 46.6 25.95%
Greece 703.2 143.1 38.1 607.3 141.3 41.7 13.4 13.4 3.2 9.36% 17.4 17.4 4.7 12.29%
Spain 7,477.4 3,276.9 2,431.9 6,984.2 3,062.6 2,278.0 362.3 362.3 289.8 11.06% 296.0 296.0 187.0 9.67%
Canada 4,833.7 1,776.9 1,013.0 4,041.2 1,993.1 461.9 370.8 370.8 248.6 20.87% 435.3 435.3 97.6 21.84%
USA 27,414.3 14,426.9 13,746.7 29,659.2 15,672.5 14,955.4 3,683.5 3,683.5 3,658.0 25.53% 4,227.6 4,227.6 4,205.1 26.97%
Japan 17,474.6 9,157.2 7,724.2 16,440.4 10,152.3 6,756.5 338.4 338.4 206.9 3.70% 341.8 341.8 198.0 3.37%
Korea 841.8 460.2 296.3 850.8 511.4 390.0 56.6 56.6 30.5 12.29% 89.3 89.3 71.8 17.46%
Australia 2,954.1 1,536.1 823.3 2,761.6 1,507.0 609.7 202.7 202.7 65.2 13.19% 201.8 201.8 70.3 13.39%
New Zealand 348.0 161.1 138.8 309.2 126.9 102.2 19.1 19.1 18.5 11.85% 17.7 17.7 17.1 13.93%
IDA 9,291.3 8,874.3 8,009.3 12,639.2 10,919.2 10,335.7 993.1 993.1 925.5 11.19% 1,214.4 1,214.4 1,152.2 11.12%
IDB Special 551.6 159.0 159.0 1,024.7 587.2 587.2 22.2 22.2 13.4 3.78%
AfDF 1,755.1 1,787.6 1,754.4 3,008.2 2,666.0 2,626.8 111.8 111.8 108.3 6.26% 104.3 104.3 101.1 3.91%
EC 13,197.0 8,965.5 7,783.3 13,445.7 9,392.2 8,097.6 618.0 618.0 570.4 6.89% 559.9 559.9 519.0 5.96%
GAVI 623.8 623.8 623.8 559.9 559.9 559.9 623.8 623.8 623.8 100.00% 367.4 367.4 367.4 100.00%
GFATM 2,167.6 2,171.6 2,171.6 2,336.9 2,336.8 2,336.8 2,171.6 2,171.6 2,171.6 100.00% 2,336.8 2,336.8 2,336.8 100.00%
UN (Select Agencies) 2,278.2 1,477.0 1,477.0 2,596.6 1,667.8 1,667.8 475.2 475.2 475.2 32.17% 637.2 637.2 637.2 38.21%
TOTAL 165,984.3 77,847.8 64,655.8 167,098.1 83,351.9 67,576.9 12,697.2 12,697.2 11,543.4 16.31% 13,371.6 13,371.6 11,994.7 16.04%
2009 Overall 2009 Health 2008 Overall 2008 Health
Appendix 2: Tables 
Table A1. Gross ODA, CPA and Strict CPA by Country, Overall and Health 
Source: Authors’ calculations, CRS database  
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ME1 ME2 ME3  ME4  ME  5  ME6  ME7 
Mean, 2009  7.565865633  20.615974  70.79709  0.788762  0.85278  0.102517  0.894073
Mean,  2008  6.941324103 20.67949034 69.77504 0.784216  0.851981  0.088633 0.88523 
QuODA mean, 2009  7.061108355     68.34433  0.414103  0.832182  0.186153  0.865392
QuODA mean, 2008  7.130891645     67.89825  0.398995  0.845062  0.056209  0.861323
Is more better?  N  Y  N  Y Y  Y  Y 
Maximum,  2009  8.09095 22.9257 81.27035  1  0.996741  0.244922  1 
Minimum,  2009  7.003544 15.86137 60.04883  0.224138  0.617926  0.020104  0.134661
Standard Deviation, 2009  0.282575966  1.592115493  5.097714  0.243119  0.090198  0.059859  0.209832












Mean, 2009  1.308947367  0.366666667
Mean, 2008  1.29773731  0.275862069
Is more better?  Y  Y 
Maximum, 2009  1.532181  1 
Minimum, 2009  0.957581  0 
Standard Deviation, 2009  0.123004457  0.490132518
























RB1  RB2  RB3 RB4 RB5 
Mean, 2009  2.142208363  0.757671607  -1.56764 0.593333 0.142048 
Mean, 2008  2.055326452  0.774148093  -1.30234 0.613793 0.13484 
QuODA mean, 2009  0.620054513  0.73227619  1.063447    0.332908 
QuODA mean, 2008  0.555249955  0.7147432  1.106524    0.309226 
Is more better?  Y  Y  Y     Y 
Maximum, 2009  4.713614  1  2.314197 1  0.459246 
Minimum, 2009  0.7092393  0.2294538  -4.72581 0  0 
Standard Deviation, 2009  1.056861094  0.268389173  1.723232 0.481194 0.122904 
Number of Donors  30  30  30  30  23 
 


































TL1a TL1b  TL2  TL3 TL4  TL5  TL6  TL7  TL8 
Mean, 2009  0.573333333 0.44  0.366667 0.923439  3.813212  0.893  0.22308 1.283333  0.5391 
Mean, 2008  0.55862069     0.344828 0.911002  4.058977  0.839484  0.207455     0.557387 
QuODA mean, 2009  0.55483871 0.361290323     0.905063  4.655973  0.869791  0.373235 1.387097  0.567347 
QuODA mean, 2008  0.490322581        0.895291  4.84379  0.814543  0.386715     0.38771 
Is more better?  Y  Y     Y  Y  Y  N  Y Y 
Maximum, 2009  1  1  1  1  5.497168  1  0.783392  2.5  0.717398 
Minimum, 2009  0  0  0  0.666667  0  0.208  0  0  0.003523 
Standard Deviation, 2009  0.497534149  0.499378925  0.490133 0.126828 1.853486  0.169753  0.229816  0.795281  0.156983 









































































ME1 ME2 ME3 ME4 ME 5M E 6M E 7M E 1M E 2M E 3M E 4M E  5M E 6M E 7
Austria ‐0.21663 ‐2.2066 ‐0.96456 ‐1.14234 0.40199 ‐1.57576 ‐2.83424 ‐0.68257 ‐0.93369 ‐0.104 ‐0.90747 0.243649 ‐1.37679 ‐3.61914
Belgium 1.182865 0.511966 ‐0.45687 ‐1.67663 0.206234 ‐0.83676 0.483908 1.989985 0.568562 ‐0.67229 ‐1.18518 0.272741 ‐0.27297 0.33804
Denmark 1.218516 0.74829 1.523679 0.664413 0.655492 0.58124 0.483908 1.083532 0.761251 1.544149 0.706746 0.683736 0.263926 0.50482
France ‐1.69276 ‐2.30284 ‐0.13105 ‐0.69806 0.902735 ‐0.06063 0.483908 ‐1.04181 ‐1.32557 0.265751 ‐0.78744 0.681477 ‐0.43723 ‐0.58158
Germany 0.1596 1.248866 0.178114 ‐0.87104 ‐0.86848 ‐0.89059 ‐0.11867 ‐0.48225 1.190349 ‐0.39643 ‐0.75449 ‐0.49733 ‐0.71849 ‐0.01793
Italy ‐0.79048 ‐0.30928 ‐0.9036 0.140327 ‐0.82542 1.276103 ‐0.95738 ‐0.19096 0.081719 ‐0.53394 0.243879 ‐0.87106 1.903926 ‐1.88495
Netherlan 0.144347 0.610042 1.477435 0.819789 1.018104 1.529853 0.214263 ‐0.32006 0.419138 2.108448 0.767273 0.96862 1.631789 0.50482
Norway 1.186544 0.559889 0.547578 0.390444 ‐0.68676 1.830329 0.483908 1.337428 0.137928 ‐0.58719 0.385245 ‐1.27092 2.379016 0.50482
Portugal ‐1.43384 ‐1.87876 2.163923 ‐0.43906 1.655887 ‐1.15452 0.483908 ‐1.05865 ‐1.84575 2.073731 0.08975 1.475728 ‐1.08052 0.50482
Sweden 0.407814 0.157536 ‐0.25009 0.869964 0.148332 1.894209 0.483908 0.418741 0.154962 ‐0.36244 0.78959 ‐0.40765 0.974841 0.50482
Switzerlan 0.576182 ‐0.49818 0.648962 0.866217 1.356394 ‐0.63546 0.483908 0.499831 ‐0.18178 0.419657 0.751234 0.711359 ‐0.74151 0.50482
United Kin 0.765036 1.52923 ‐0.38151 0.185334 ‐0.35824 ‐0.27817 0.483908 0.589936 1.450728 ‐0.08677 0.179698 ‐0.23027 0.169866 0.50482
Finland 0.366497 0.306131 0.62384 ‐0.85584 ‐0.78546 0.67448 0.318075 0.626619 0.32855 1.023914 ‐1.29398 ‐0.7941 0.157221 ‐0.47822
Ireland 1.42996 0.633167 0.710103 0.850318 0.191077 0.108407 0.483908 1.765199 0.59792 0.716779 0.840742 ‐0.28857 ‐0.50151 0.50482
Luxembou ‐0.05602 ‐0.95223 0.623563 0.941529 0.726073 0.989379 0.483908 0.092259 ‐0.69386 0.631558 0.854609 0.864482 0.4314 0.50482
Greece ‐2.28337 ‐0.99724 1.284939 ‐2.3712 1.387196 ‐1.09023 0.356509 0.130463 ‐2.98634 ‐1.76778 ‐2.12735 1.40204 ‐1.09641 ‐1.45202
Spain ‐1.31682 ‐0.2082 0.222784 0.06907 ‐0.09646 ‐0.20109 ‐0.66145 ‐1.85821 ‐0.38526 0.350375 ‐0.64578 0.184104 0.020183 0.000215
Canada 1.087396 0.846795 ‐1.81475 ‐0.49788 ‐0.50404 0.550643 ‐0.14384 0.491645 0.515512 ‐0.4255 ‐2.32242 ‐1.15388 0.951135 0.423777
USA ‐0.39641 0.566301 0.740479 0.913781 ‐1.2855 ‐0.35772 0.331478 ‐0.67457 0.661857 0.848491 0.84697 ‐0.71729 ‐0.25081 0.329586
Japan ‐0.82911 ‐0.03865 ‐1.03811 ‐0.75544 ‐1.21637 ‐1.02879 0.483908 ‐0.13007 0.419013 ‐1.07012 ‐0.86092 ‐1.29505 ‐0.94314 0.50482
Korea ‐0.85302 0.046645 ‐0.79862 ‐1.07372 0.035301 ‐0.27047 ‐3.39303 ‐1.51762 0.174729 ‐0.39021 0.06372 ‐0.22879 ‐0.12967 ‐2.17765
Australia ‐0.81076 ‐0.44588 ‐0.26602 ‐2.02257 0.678851 ‐0.2376 0.375569 ‐0.7758 ‐0.37704 ‐0.73216 ‐1.812 0.869699 ‐0.36704 0.502555
New Zeala ‐0.63762 ‐1.49125 ‐0.43113 0.80273 1.378415 ‐0.81685 0.394447 ‐0.73863 ‐1.48875 1.306774 0.73466 1.411869 ‐0.96722 0.432184
IDA 0.8614 0.926392 0.133696 0.646079 0.284387 0.483908 0.344316 1.227931 ‐0.46644 0.658231 0.499039 0.50482
IDB Special ‐1.60865 ‐1.16157 ‐1.00667 0.868867 1.596063 0.50482
AfDF 1.176849 0.550528 0.066312 0.804511 0.434994 0.483908 1.50106 0.686322 0.31028 0.740459 0.638867 0.50482
AsDF
EC ‐0.75407 0.129426 ‐0.07752 0.607013 ‐0.33362 ‐1.62426 ‐0.81389 ‐0.14381 ‐0.0061 0.568754 ‐1.04705 0.108026
IFAD
GFATM 0.184276 0.632626 0.108762 0.944093 ‐1.56712 0.483908 ‐0.41892 0.865888 0.077075 0.868867 ‐0.51167 0.50482
GAVI 1.126026 0.948913 ‐2.39292 0.944093 ‐0.26877 0.483908 1.090041 0.841098 ‐2.0545 0.868867 ‐0.58609 0.50482
UN (Select 0.197623 0.376352 ‐1.14741 0.944093 ‐2.66522 0.483908 0.351602 0.439964 ‐1.01445 0.868867 ‐2.60376 0.50482
2008 Health QuODA 2009 Health QuODA























FI1 FI2 FI1 FI2
Austria 1.545155 ‐0.60648 0.9390262 ‐0.748097
Belgium 0.318682 1.592006 ‐0.0361685 1.2921675
Denmark ‐0.12407 1.592006 ‐0.3336519 1.2921675
France ‐0.9519 ‐0.60648 ‐0.6196256 ‐0.748097
Germany 0.401604 ‐0.60648 0.0471528 ‐0.748097
Italy ‐0.95204 ‐0.60648 ‐0.5407643 ‐0.748097
Netherlands ‐0.39865 ‐0.60648 ‐0.8831384 ‐0.748097
Norway 1.743798 ‐0.60648 1.126044 1.2921675
Portugal 0.718459 ‐0.60648 0.7924641 ‐0.748097
Sweden 0.277221 ‐0.60648 ‐0.029119 ‐0.748097
Switzerland 1.460422 ‐0.60648 0.9217288 ‐0.748097
United Kingdom 1.001099 1.592006 0.9070027 1.2921675
Finland 1.226661 ‐0.60648 1.085894 1.2921675
Ireland 0.724463 ‐0.60648 0.4931549 ‐0.748097
Luxembourg ‐0.76193 ‐0.60648 ‐0.3237743 ‐0.748097
Greece ‐0.09835 ‐0.60648 0.7929051 ‐0.748097
Spain ‐0.68675 ‐0.60648 ‐1.28702 ‐0.748097
Canada 1.179848 1.592006 0.6321111 1.2921675
USA 0.226201 ‐0.60648 0.147947 ‐0.748097
Japan ‐1.0037 ‐0.60648 ‐0.6034612 ‐0.748097
Korea ‐1.4336 1.592006 ‐2.856534 ‐0.748097
Australia ‐1.02466 1.592006 ‐0.7082317 1.2921675
New Zealand ‐2.05283 1.592006 ‐2.481659 1.2921675
IDA 0.541766 ‐0.60648 0.2441406 ‐0.748097
IDB Special 1.814846 1.2921675
AfDF ‐0.44686 ‐0.60648 0.3804384 ‐0.748097
AsDF
EC ‐1.69969 ‐0.60648 0.1823003 1.2921675
IFAD
GFATM 0.550318 ‐0.60648 0.1545498 1.2921675
GAVI ‐0.20489 ‐0.60648 ‐0.0245194 ‐0.748097

















































RB1 RB2 RB3 RB4 RB5 RB1 RB2 RB3 RB4 RB5
Austria ‐0.97345 ‐0.97189 ‐1.21447 ‐1.25341 ‐0.285406 ‐0.21487 ‐1.36001 ‐1.14088 ‐1.20094 ‐0.31821
Belgium ‐0.96231 0.273819 ‐0.32618 0.788665 ‐0.8821213 ‐0.43964 0.299475 ‐0.64624 0.823118 ‐0.58241
Denmark ‐1.45121 ‐1.02171 0.659416 ‐1.25341 ‐1.047663 ‐1.31789 0.872639 1.116736 ‐1.20094 ‐0.87125
France 1.542367 ‐1.19326 ‐0.76837 0.788665 ‐1.175257 1.743846 ‐1.6452 ‐0.3574 0.823118 ‐1.15298
Germany ‐0.55935 0.233864 ‐0.38904 0.788665 ‐0.9719216 ‐1.06543 ‐0.14171 ‐0.29973 0.823118 ‐1.03216
Italy 0.25376 ‐1.35052 ‐0.91614 0.788665 ‐0.559897 ‐0.4326 ‐1.04318 ‐0.91111 0.823118 0.175645
Netherlands 0.086976 0.907011 1.105509 0.788665 ‐0.1993084 ‐0.17872 0.872639 1.027669 0.823118 ‐0.44698
Norway ‐0.93491 ‐0.54983 ‐0.3363 0.788665 0.9708406 ‐0.89106 ‐0.50798 ‐0.29119 0.823118 0.392599
Portugal 1.070434 0.907011 ‐0.72136 0.788665 ‐1.175257 2.431056 ‐1.00554 ‐1.57283 0.823118 ‐1.15298
Sweden ‐0.89781 0.907011 ‐1.2142 0.788665 1.019761 ‐0.43333 0.871619 ‐1.7897 0.823118 1.087342
Switzerland ‐0.6204 0.547395 0.706697 ‐1.25341 ‐0.6325009 ‐1.08276 0.672972 0.361133 ‐1.20094 ‐0.86015
United Kingdom ‐0.05468 0.873529 0.433064 0.788665 ‐0.1818143 ‐0.17761 0.838211 0.233387 0.823118 0.507965
Finland ‐0.34496 0.907011 ‐0.43648 0.788665 ‐0.7216645 ‐0.45023 0.872639 0.203285 0.823118 ‐0.71131
Ireland ‐1.1749 0.907011 ‐1.03533 ‐1.25341 ‐0.7229312 ‐1.35476 0.872639 0.060773 ‐1.20094 ‐0.41311
Luxembourg ‐0.59115 0.907011 ‐0.46399 ‐1.25341 1.411176 ‐0.24474 0.872639 ‐0.35528 ‐1.20094 0.458393
Greece 0.730532 ‐1.87385 ‐0.53381 ‐1.25341 0.1199859 0.08173 ‐1.90214 ‐1.00054 ‐1.20094 ‐0.22472
Spain 0.402317 ‐1.3556 ‐0.34319 0.788665 1.916707 0.643485 ‐1.21515 ‐0.40223 0.823118 0.488362
Canada ‐0.49476 0.675041 ‐0.02884 0.788665 0.8587604 0.678263 0.675504 ‐0.95699 0.823118 2.574656
USA ‐0.01766 ‐1.10833 0.538007 ‐1.25341 ‐0.7136465 ‐0.11124 ‐0.86527 0.686238 ‐1.20094 ‐0.76847
Japan 0.872751 ‐1.11289 0.060658 ‐1.25341 1.108527 0.140943 ‐0.9397 0.788855 ‐1.20094 1.422861
Korea ‐0.61453 ‐0.71532 ‐1.23628 ‐1.25341 ‐0.6992591 0.133725 ‐0.88911 ‐0.94347 ‐1.20094 ‐1.02643
Australia 1.463782 0.907011 ‐0.20698 0.788665 0.7359278 1.979143 0.872639 ‐0.19265 0.823118 1.346503
New Zealand 2.904602 0.902846 ‐0.39348 ‐1.25341 1.826963 1.930175 0.872639 ‐0.05984 ‐1.20094 1.10684
IDA 0.228041 0.907011 1.714982 ‐1.25341 ‐0.07642 0.872639 1.940834 ‐1.20094
IDB Special ‐0.02485 0.872639 0.206084 ‐1.20094
AfDF ‐1.04202 0.907011 2.419594 0.788665 ‐1.33981 0.872639 0.740869 0.823118
AsDF
EC 0.988593 ‐0.85638 1.49805 0.788665 0.372869 ‐0.78864 1.757728 0.823118
IFAD
GFATM 0.197519 0.907011 1.876904 0.788665 0.019394 0.872639 2.199789 0.823118
GAVI ‐0.83459 0.907011 0.730353 0.788665 ‐1.12618 0.872639 0.617245 0.823118












































































TL1 TL2 TL3 TL4 TL5 TL6 TL7 TL1a TL1b TL2 TL3 TL4 TL5 TL6 TL7 TL8
Austria ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 0.71411 0.250106 0.023336 0.625361 ‐0.33258 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 0.603661 0.325368 ‐0.12931 0.827002 1.529858 ‐0.2413
Belgium ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 0.71411 0.792048 0.861424 ‐0.0824 ‐0.33889 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 ‐2.02456 ‐2.05732 0.575791 0.413247 ‐1.61369 ‐0.16331
Denmark 0.883368 1.354431 0.56552 0.684463 ‐1.72401 0.033482 0.79767 0.857563 1.121393 1.292168 0.419224 0.64115 ‐4.03528 0.966615 0.901149 0.884662
France ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 0.588587 ‐0.40513 ‐0.88621 0.202743 ‐0.41771 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 ‐1.31776 0.175877 ‐0.00039 ‐1.39067 ‐0.98498 ‐0.33432
Germany 0.883368 ‐0.71286 0.71411 0.229927 0.646168 0.471388 0.821815 0.857563 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 0.603661 0.337631 0.60658 0.571143 ‐0.35627 0.541065
Italy ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 0.628096 0.417131 ‐0.08178 0.6457 0.885358 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 ‐0.14726 0.375466 0.041196 0.930523 ‐1.61369 0.964632
Netherlands 0.883368 1.354431 0.69819 0.042911 0.274198 ‐0.35869 0.446046 0.857563 1.121393 1.292168 0.5839 0.190818 0.198989 ‐0.29994 ‐0.98498 0.709102
Norway 0.883368 1.354431 0.71411 0.66297 0.758573 ‐0.08163 0.639978 0.857563 ‐0.88109 1.292168 0.603661 0.729894 0.566081 ‐1.87452 0.901149 0.716347
Portugal ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 ‐0.80151 0.063336 0.783747 0.558404 ‐2.25219 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 0.603661 0.212315 0.630327 0.951159 ‐0.98498 ‐1.87645
Sweden 0.883368 1.354431 ‐1.62077 ‐0.54933 ‐0.32935 ‐0.61384 ‐0.15557 0.857563 1.121393 1.292168 0.393102 0.591382 ‐0.24175 ‐1.95895 0.901149 0.205222
Switzerland 0.883368 ‐0.71286 ‐1.91967 ‐1.99582 0.582747 0.199948 0.526847 0.857563 1.121393 ‐0.7481 ‐1.98217 ‐1.33822 ‐0.74817 ‐0.79384 0.901149 0.767238
United Kingdom 0.883368 1.354431 0.71411 0.561625 0.861424 0.224667 0.999834 0.857563 1.121393 1.292168 0.595885 0.589323 0.624252 0.911349 0.901149 0.695129
Finland 0.883368 ‐0.71286 0.71411 0.680452 ‐0.68565 ‐0.18474 ‐0.50937 0.857563 1.121393 ‐0.7481 0.603661 0.719556 ‐0.61956 ‐0.31798 0.901149 ‐0.26046
Ireland 0.883368 1.354431 0.358741 0.864732 0.451449 0.452961 0.547005 0.857563 ‐0.88109 1.292168 0.603661 0.905453 0.133128 0.839994 0.901149 0.657506
Luxembourg ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 ‐1.67005 ‐1.20213 0.857034 0.657322 ‐0.50349 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 ‐1.99965 ‐1.63237 0.629793 0.909634 ‐1.61369 ‐0.33084
Greece ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 0.71411 0.351381 0.861424 0.617326 ‐0.11551 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 0.603661 0.13959 0.630327 0.140182 ‐1.61369 ‐0.39054
Spain 0.883368 ‐0.71286 0.46836 0.480664 0.617587 0.08745 ‐0.18627 0.857563 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 0.390562 0.453008 0.307329 ‐1.31878 ‐0.98498 0.156853
Canada ‐1.11801 1.354431 ‐0.78807 0.490002 ‐2.55955 0.482994 0.195503 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 1.292168 ‐0.45621 0.750372 0.301254 0.942179 ‐0.35627 0.148397
USA ‐1.11801 1.354431 0.71411 0.809581 ‐1.18289 ‐0.2881 0.788599 ‐1.15235 1.121393 1.292168 0.603661 0.825545 ‐0.61122 ‐0.32115 1.529858 0.956567
Japan ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 ‐1.95146 ‐0.66316 0.014685 ‐0.45868 ‐0.08573 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 0.603661 ‐0.28006 0.617667 0.807637 0.272441 0.262604
Korea ‐1.11801 ‐0.71286 ‐1.192 ‐2.71512 0.861424 0.590676 1.307585 ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 ‐0.7481 0.603661 ‐2.05732 0.630327 0.712915 ‐0.98498 1.135779
Australia 0.883368 1.354431 ‐0.42642 0.170781 ‐1.705 ‐2.61068 ‐2.21448 0.857563 1.121393 1.292168 0.478612 0.662687 ‐0.64297 ‐0.00991 0.272441 ‐1.45604
New Zealand 0.883368 ‐0.71286 ‐0.14028 0.41301 0.699215 ‐3.97109 ‐3.03962 0.857563 1.121393 ‐0.7481 0.132934 0.537338 0.535592 ‐0.83638 ‐0.35627 ‐1.90117
IDA 0.883368 ‐0.71286 0.639195 0.944122 0.659676 0.561649 0.857563 1.121393 ‐0.7481 0.603661 0.908534 ‐0.41535 ‐0.35627 0.293492
IDB Special ‐1.15235 ‐0.88109 1.292168 0.603661 0.006907 0.970689 0.272441 ‐3.41169
AfDF ‐1.11801 1.354431 ‐1.96051 ‐2.71512 0.659676 0.547937 0.857563 ‐0.88109 1.292168 ‐2.02456 ‐2.05732 0.965927 0.901149 0.033672
AsDF
EC 0.883368 ‐0.71286 0.70966 0.69356 0.386307 0.301981 0.857563 1.121393 ‐0.7481 0.603661 0.496962 0.192204 0.272441 0.273978
IFAD
GFATM 0.883368 ‐0.71286 0.71411 0.463733 0.563878 0.369696 0.857563 1.121393 ‐0.7481 0.603661 0.902498 ‐2.43809 ‐0.35627 0.195687
GAVI 0.883368 ‐0.71286 0.71411 0.59561 0.203345 0.532792 0.857563 1.121393 ‐0.7481 ‐2.02456 ‐2.05732 ‐0.00439 0.901149 0.695447
UN (Select Agencies) ‐0.71774 ‐0.71286 0.673276 ‐0.41632 0.32654 ‐0.11888 0.857563 ‐0.4806 ‐0.7481 0.531276 0.002256 ‐0.07247 0.901149 0.072748
2008 Health QuODA 2009 Health QuODA





Table A7. Correlations 
 









Maximizing efficiency  1.0000  0.1421  0.3546  0.3320 
Fostering institutions     1.0000  0.3132  0.2615 
Reducing burden        1.0000  0.2583 
Transparency and learning           1.0000 
 
   Health QuODA 








Maximizing efficiency  0.5491  0.4959 -0.0697 
Reducing burden  0.3208  0.6416  0.0591 
Transparency and learning  0.1736  0.5127  0.7732 
Correlations across common indicators 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
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Table A8. Selected indicators for aid-dependent countries 
  Share of untied aid  Share of strict CPA  Significance of aid relationships 
Fragmentation across donor 
agencies 
  2008  2008 z  2009  2009 z  2008  2008 z  2009  2009 z  2008  2008 z  2009  2009 z  2008  2008 z  2009  2009 z 
Austria  0.891 -0.249  0.765 -1.206  0.360 -2.260  0.444 -1.677  0.012 -0.997  0.008 -1.104  0.809 -0.051  0.513 -1.239 
Belgium  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.435 -1.893  0.613 -0.922  0.418 -0.303  0.325 -0.547  0.699 -0.532  0.798 -0.040 
Denmark  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.961 0.688  0.971 0.681  0.177 -0.715  0.171 -0.818  0.501 -1.402  1.000 0.809 
France  1.000 0.403  0.928 -0.052  0.779 -0.206  0.617 -0.902  0.940 0.591  1.096 0.808  0.505 -1.385  0.305 -2.114 
Germany  0.807 -0.753  0.887 -0.341  0.462 -1.760  0.531 -1.291  0.202 -0.672  0.252 -0.674  0.998 0.781  0.993 0.781 
Italy  0.604 -1.964  0.616 -2.257  0.714 -0.524  0.769 -0.224  0.130 -0.795  1.373 1.295  0.585 -1.031  0.758 -0.210 
Netherlands  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.977 0.766  0.983 0.735  0.385 -0.358  0.416 -0.386  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
Norway  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.892 0.349  0.857 0.172  0.411 -0.315  0.560 -0.133  0.635 -0.812  0.572 -0.992 
Portugal  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.684 -0.671  0.847 0.128  2.446 3.171  1.900 2.221  1.000 0.788  0.577 -0.968 
Sweden  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.997 0.864  0.966 0.658  0.306 -0.494  0.160 -0.837  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
Switzerland  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.976 0.760  0.966 0.659  0.198 -0.678  0.133 -0.884  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
United  Kingdom  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.858 0.179  0.912 0.415  0.643 0.083  0.878 0.425  0.963 0.626  0.968 0.676 
Finland  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.605 -1.060  0.587 -1.037  0.059 -0.916  0.072 -0.992  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
Ireland  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.985 0.805  1.000 0.811  0.750 0.267  0.706 0.122  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
Luxembourg  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.998 0.867  1.000 0.811  0.398 -0.336  0.257 -0.667  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
Greece  1.000 0.403  0.772 -1.157  0.587 -1.150  0.223 -2.670  0.014 -0.994  0.010 -1.101  0.845 0.107  0.587 -0.926 
Spain  0.627 -1.828  0.792 -1.017  0.664 -0.770  0.479 -1.522  1.405 1.389  1.822 2.085  0.463 -1.565  0.552 -1.074 
Canada  0.865 -0.405  0.972 0.259  0.807 -0.068  0.449 -1.657  0.606 0.019  0.712 0.133  0.968 0.646  0.963 0.654 
USA  0.996 0.376  0.996 0.427  0.994 0.850  0.996 0.793  1.270 1.157  1.358 1.269  0.462 -1.573  0.505 -1.274 
Japan  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.549 -1.336  0.707 -0.501  0.458 -0.234  0.877 0.423  0.504 -1.387  0.586 -0.934 
Korea  0.257 -4.037  0.396 -3.811  0.647 -0.853  0.764 -0.245  0.009 -1.002  0.016 -1.090  0.955 0.590  0.691 -0.489 
Australia  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.982 0.790  0.998 0.801  0.015 -0.993  0.105 -0.934  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
New Zealand  1.000  0.403       1.000  0.877  1.000  0.811  0.008 -1.005  0.019 -1.084  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
IDA  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.984 0.798  0.982 0.732  1.221 1.073  1.192 0.978  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 




AfDF  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.970 0.728  0.967 0.665  0.887 0.501  0.639 0.004  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
EC  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  0.943 0.598  0.937 0.529  0.434 -0.275  0.431 -0.361  0.503 -1.392  0.558 -1.051 
GFATM  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  1.000 0.877  1.000 0.811  1.688 1.874  1.675 1.827  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
GAVI  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  1.000 0.877  1.000 0.811  0.690 0.164  0.501 -0.238  1.000 0.788  1.000 0.809 
UN (Select 
Agencies)  1.000 0.403  1.000 0.458  1.000 0.877  1.000 0.811  1.056 0.791  1.046 0.721  0.395 -1.864  0.302 -2.126 
Mean  0.933 0.000  0.935 0.000  0.821 0.000  0.819 0.000  0.594 0.000  0.636 0.000  0.820 0.000  0.808 0.000 
Standard  deviation 0.167 1.000  0.141 1.000  0.204 1.000  0.223 1.000  0.584 1.000  0.569 1.000  0.228 1.000  0.238 1.000 
Mean for all 
countries 0.885     0.894     0.784     0.789     2.055     2.142     0.774     0.758     
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Selected indicators for aid-dependent countries 
  Median project size (log)  Share of aid through multilateral channels
  2008  2008 z  2009  2009 z  2008  2008 z  2009  2009 z 
Austria  -3.833  -1.348 -3.603 -0.989 0.089 -0.324 0.134 0.110 
Belgium  -1.728  -0.304 -2.753 -0.598 0.026 -0.589 0.022 -0.527 
Denmark  0.242  0.672 0.626 0.954 0.013  -0.644 0.000  -0.653 
France  -2.300  -0.588 -1.734 -0.130 0.000 -0.698 0.000 -0.653 
Germany  -2.329  -0.602 -2.293 -0.386 0.000 -0.698 0.000 -0.653 
Italy  -2.853  -0.862 -2.888 -0.660 0.000 -0.698 0.318 1.162 
Netherlands  1.402  1.248 -0.760  0.318 0.034  -0.554 0.056  -0.332 
Norway  -2.396  -0.636 -2.129 -0.312 0.135 -0.132 0.093 -0.123 
Portugal  -2.629  -0.752 -4.967 -1.615 0.000 -0.698 0.000 -0.653 
Sweden  -3.614  -1.240 -5.141 -1.695 0.039 -0.536 0.026 -0.503 
Switzerland  0.090 0.597  -2.383 -0.428 0.000 -0.698 0.000 -0.653 
United  Kingdom  -1.037  0.038 -0.705  0.343 0.102  -0.270 0.150  0.203 
Finland  -1.445  -0.164 -0.954 0.228  0.000 -0.698 0.000 -0.653 
Ireland  -3.263  -1.066 -1.057 0.181  0.058 -0.457 0.091 -0.135 
Luxembourg  -2.083  -0.481 -1.937 -0.223 0.370 0.849  0.151 0.205 
Greece  -2.494  -0.685 -5.318 -1.776 0.587 1.753  0.000 -0.653 
Spain  -1.554  -0.218 -2.033 -0.267 0.293 0.527  0.144 0.166 
Canada  -0.768  0.172  -2.874 -0.654 0.339 0.720  0.318 1.158 
USA  -0.057  0.524 0.291 0.801 0.025  -0.591 0.026  -0.504 
Japan  -0.042  0.532 0.423 0.861 0.202  0.145 0.382  1.525 
Korea  -3.479  -1.173 -3.107 -0.761 0.042 -0.522 0.000 -0.653 
Australia         -2.370 -0.422 0.623 1.905  0.725 3.477 
New Zealand  0.825  0.962        0.863  2.908  0.000  -0.653 
IDA 1.617  1.355  1.609  1.406             
IDB Special      1.705  1.450             
AfDF     -0.260  0.547             
EC 3.848  2.461  2.635  1.877             
GFATM 2.576  1.830  2.926  2.011             
GAVI 0.461  0.781  0.239  0.777             
UN (Select Agencies)  -3.239  -1.054  -3.276  -0.838             
Mean  -1.114 0.000  -1.451 0.000  0.167 0.000  0.115 0.000 
Standard  deviation  2.016  1.000 2.177 1.000 0.239  1.000 0.175  1.000 
Mean for all countries  -1.302     -1.568     0.135     0.142    





Table A9. 2008 Rankings on Health QuODA for Each Donor 








Austria 29  7  29  17 
Belgium 16  3  20  16 
Denmark 1  5  27  9 
France 25  26  18  22 
Germany 19  16  19  6 
Italy 22  27  23  13 
Netherlands 2  22  6  5 
Norway 4  6  16  2 
Portugal 17  13  12  24 
Sweden 7  17  13  18 
Switzerland 8  8  21  21 
United 
Kingdom 
10 2  9  1 
Finland 13  9  14  15 
Ireland 3  12  26  3 
Luxembourg 9  25  15  25 
Greece 26  20  25  14 
Spain 21  24  11 11 
Canada 15  1  10  20 
USA 14  18  24  12 
Japan 27  28  17 28 
Korea 28  11  28 23 
Australia 24  10  4  27 
New Zealand  18  19  2  29 
IDA 6  15  7 4 
IDB Special*             
AfDF 5  23  3  26 
EC 23  29  5  8 
GFATM 12  14  1  7 
GAVI 11  21  8  10 
UN (Select 
Agencies) 
20 4  22  19 




Table A10. 2009 Rankings on Health QuODA for Each Donor 








Austria 29  11  29  16 
Belgium 13  8  19  30 
Denmark 2  9  22  7 
France 26  27  20  28 
Germany 22  20  24  12 
Italy 19  25  21  23 
Netherlands 1  28  7  4 
Norway 6  2  17  8 
Portugal 16  14  18  26 
Sweden 9  22  12  6 
Switzerland 10  12  26  22 
United 
Kingdom 
8 4  6  1 
Finland 17  3  11  11 
Ireland 4  15  25  2 
Luxembourg 7  23  16  29 
Greece 30  13  30  27 
Spain 24  29  13 21 
Canada 20  5  3  14 
USA 12  18  27 3 
Japan 27  26  14 17 
Korea 28  30  28  25 
Australia 25  10  2  9 
New Zealand  15  24  5  18 
IDA 5  17  8  10 
IDB Special  18  1  15  24 
AfDF 3  16  10  19 
EC 21  6  4  5 
GFATM 11  7  1  15 
GAVI 14  21  9  20 
UN (Select 
Agencies) 






Table A11. Change 
from 2008 to 2009  Maximizing efficiency  Fostering institutions  Reducing burden Transparency and learning 
Austria 0  -4  0  1 
Belgium  3 -5  1  -14 
Denmark -1  -4  5 2 
France -1  -1  -2 -6 
Germany -3  -4  -5  -6 
Italy 3  2  2  -10 
Netherlands 1  -6  -1  1 
Norway -2  4  -1  -6 
Portugal 1  -1  -6  -2 
Sweden -2  -5  1  12 
Switzerland -2  -4  -5  -1 
United Kingdom  2  -2  3  0 
Finland -4  6  3  4 
Ireland -1  -3  1  1 
Luxembourg 2  2  -1  -4 
Greece -4  7  -5  -13 
Spain -3  -5  -2  -10 
Canada  -5 -4  7  6 
USA 2  0  -3  9 
Japan 0  2  3 11 
Korea 0  -19 0  -2 
Australia -1  0  2  18 
New Zealand  3 -5  -3  11 
IDA 1  -2  -1  -6 
IDB Special         
AfDF 2  7  -7 7 
EC 2  23 1  3 
GFATM 1  7  0  -8 
GAVI -3  0  -1 -10 
UN (Select Agencies)  -3  -15  -1  6  
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Table A12. Share of health aid with the objective of decreasing gender inequality. 
  2008, %  2009, % 
Austria 0.6615404  0.5517077 
Belgium 0.5234019  0.7919376 
Denmark 0.2849143  0.4750341 
France 0.0799658  0.1501861 
Germany 0.8945448  0.8791162 
Italy 0.1603719  0.2047571 
Netherlands 0.4263462  0.4926361 
Norway 0.6872964  0.6834884 
Portugal 0.1489179  0.1439132 
Sweden 0.9586947  0.9758974 
Switzerland 0.2313055  0.4705623 
United Kingdom  0.4085909  0.7679721 
Finland 0.6723127  0.7098302 
Ireland 0.565768  0.6986479 
Luxembourg 0.1680894  0.2465381 
Greece 0.351023  0.3230859 
Spain 0.3276288  0.4193304 
Canada 0.3810595  0.4590606 
USA 0  0.4356206 
Japan 0.1307142  0.4277683 
Korea 0.2614827  0.1931211 
Australia 0.5349767  0.4161304 
New Zealand  0.7549482  0.786755 
IDA 0.1175495  0.0912478 
IDB Special  N/A  0 
AfDF 0  0 
EC 0.3097992  0.3314569 
GAVI 0  0 
GFATM 0  0 





Appendix 3. Aid Effectiveness in Health: A List of Country-
Specific Cases 
Aid Effectiveness in Health: A List of Country-Specific Cases (Google/Medline/Econlit 
search using combinations of following keywords: aid, assistance, effectiveness, health, 
governance, harmonization, coordination, JANS, SWAp, ownership, case study, country 
specific) 
Country Paper  Name 
(Main findings) 
Nepal    Harmonization of Donor Assistance in Nepal 
Harmonization of donors deemed to be inefficient; aid integration plan did not work. 
Uganda  Joint Assessment of Uganda's Health Sector Strategic & Investment 
Plan 
Uganda has led the Public Financial Management (PFM) reports in Africa; Adequate national 
regulations; Orderly budget process; Fiduciary and financial problems come from the lack of 
sanctions/remedies/training/shortage of qualified staff; No clear prioritization plan 
Tanzania  Health Spending in Tanzania: The Impact of Current Aid Structures 
and Aid Effectiveness 
Need for sustained policy dialogue; Need for more transparent consultation processes; 
outreach to CSOs; CSO capacity and partnership should be built; increased coordination 
under JAST helped increase efficiency, but non-state actors were excluded; SWAp program 
in effect; Possible conflicts between IHP+ and EU - too many parallel structures?  
Uganda  Can donor aid for health be effective in a poor country? Assessment 
of prerequisites for aid effectiveness in Uganda. 
Between 2004-2007, the level of aid increased from US$6 per capita to US$11. Aid was 
found to be unpredictable with expenditure varying between 174-360 percent from budgets. 
More than 50% of aid was found to be off budget and unavailable for comprehensive 
planning. There was disproportionate funding for some items such as drugs. Key health 
system elements such as human resources and infrastructure have not been given due 
attention in investment. The government's health funding from domestic sources grew only 






Uganda  Global Health Initiatives and aid effectiveness: insights from a 
Ugandan case study. 
Results: The Ugandan government had a stated preference for donor funding to be 
channelled through the general or sectoral budgets. Despite this preference, two large GHIs 
opted to allocate resources and deliver activities through projects with a disease-specific 
approach. The mixed motives of contributor country governments, recipient country 
governments and GHI executives produced incentive regimes in conflict between different 
aid mechanisms. 
Kenya    A Case Study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya, with a focus on Health 
Very volatile aid; health aid volatility higher than overall aid; Very fragmented compared to 
other countries; Efforts to align sectoral distribution of external resources with priorities 
Vietnam  Player or referee? Aid effectiveness and the governance of health 
policy development: Lessons from Vietnam 
Qualitative analysis; Principles of aid effectiveness have political ramifications  
Lao PDR  Paris on the Mekong: Using the aid effectiveness agenda to support 
human resources for health in the Lao PDR 
Research shows pathways where aid effectiveness is promoting an integrated response. 1) 
efforts to improve governance and accountability, 2) budget support is the best method to 
implement, 3) Harmonization is crucial, donor support should be increased to support 
systems 
Zambia  Stakeholder perceptions of aid coordination implementation in the 
Zambian health sector 
In order to achieve the aims of the Paris Declaration; to increase harmonization, alignment 
and ownership--resources from donors must be better coordinated in the health sector 
planning process; This requires careful consideration of contextual constraints surrounding 
each donor. 
Uganda  Health spending in Uganda: the impact of current aid structures and 
aid effectiveness   
Recommendations include donors advocating Uganda to reach the Abuja target of 15% 
More ownership through CSOs. Study finds that 21% of EU aid in Uganda relies on budget 
support. SWAp support accounts for 40% of Uganda's health sector resources. Need USD 





Botswana, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda   The 
pooling of technical assistance: an overview based on field experience in six African 
countries  
Reviewed technical assistance pooling procedures in six countries. Found that there were 
serious capacity shortages - SWAps exacerbate such shortages, which lead to additional 
requirements for TA to address capacity gaps. Mixed assessment of efficiency gains from 
TA. In some cases, TA pooling highlights the comparative advantages and costs of different 
providers, and thus increases transparency. There is some evidence of a correlation between 
the use of TA pooling and the crafting of better sector strategies and policies. TA pooling is 
affected by: policies/organizational context, behavior within international funding 
community, structure and management of the broader aid relationship between 
government/IDA community, design and management of sector programme support 
Malawi   Impact evaluation of the SWAp in Malawi.   
There are some suggestions that the rate of improvement is declining (suggesting that 
perhaps easier gains have been made, that the SWAp is performing less than ideally or that 
external factors are responsible).While far from achieving MDGs, progress has been made 
under SWAps.. Aid dependency increased during the period. The SWAp has enabled two 
broad systems issues – the delivery of a prioritised essential health package and human 
resources – to be addressed in ways which would almost certainly not have been possible 
under earlier vertical approaches. Increase in resources due to SWAp. Health outcomes have 
been improving at more rapid rate than comparable countries – and though the health status 
of poorer groups has generally been improving, equity in health outcomes does seem to have 
been declining. The increased role of public financing of health care and the corresponding 
decline in the share of private funding and the fact that the resources appear reasonably 
welltargeted should have afforded the population – and especially the poor – greater 
protection against health care costs. 
Ethiopia  A Case Study on Aid Effectiveness in Ethiopia - Analysis of the 
Health Sector Aid Architecture 
Coordination, fragmentation and unpredictability key problems. Small projects. SWAp, for 
instance, has not been effectively exploited by either the government or donors to improve 
aid predictability or harmonize funding arrangement. Progress made when transaction costs 
are reduced. Governance and rule of law overarching problems. Parallel mechanisms should 
be reduced 
Uganda  Global Health Initiatives and aid effectiveness: insights from a 
Ugandan case study  
The Ugandan government wants donor funding to be channeled through general or sectoral 
budgets, but two large GHIs allocate proejcts through a disease-specific approach: budget 




El Salvador   Health spending in El Salvador the impact of current aid structures 
and aid effectiveness  
“International cooperation needs to become more needs-based, specifically in the health 
sector, where European and other donors are still concentrating a disproportionately high 
amount of financial resources towards the fight against specific diseases and health 
infrastructure financing. The government of El Salvador will need to overcome inequities in 
terms of per capita distribution of financial resources to health by reforming the health 
sector’s currently fragmented structure. Donors could support the government in this aim, 
for instance by providing technical assistance and advice.” 
Mozambique   Health spending in Mozambique the impact of current aid 
structures and aid effectiveness    
Pooled donor funding made available for CSO capacity-building is seen as a positive 
mechanism by civil society in Mozambique. General Budget Support (GBS): at least 15% of 
such funding should be targeted at supporting non-state actors, national parliaments and 
local authorities. Vertical funds should complement HSS. In the light of the new donor 
landscape in Mozambique, European donors should advocate for the recognition, by the 
country government, of health as an investment and highlight the need to jointly re-commit 
to a post-2015 MDG frameworkNeed for a results focus 
Ethiopia  Aid effectiveness in the health sector: case study   
Political disagreement: Donors are reluctant to start delivering on their commitments 
because of their political differences. In addition, the IHP+ does not include Ethiopia’s 
largest donors, the Global Fund and the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR), which constrains the initiative and its outcomes. Major vertical donors in 
Ethiopia are showing positive signs of change. PEPFAR and GF are increasing alignment. 
Democratic ownership is missing in Ethiopia 
Zambia  Aid effectiveness in the health sector: case study   
“The IHP+ Compact did not include vertical donors, such as PEPFAR and the Global 
Fund. These organisations are currently Zambia’s largest donors to the health sector. 
Internal regulations do not allow both these donors to provide aid through local financial 
management systems, preventing them from aligning their aid flows. As a consequence, 
project aid tends to dominate the activities of vertical funds. These problems and the 
amount of resources mobilised by vertical funds, transform them into a major obstacle in the 






Mozambique  The Global Fund operating in SWAp through a common fund: issues 
and lessons from Mozambique  
GF coordination with national development strategies is essential for aid effectiveness. 
Coordination in the sector level 
Uganda  The Uganda health SWAp: new approaches for a more balanced aid 
architecture?  
The evidence points to the need for a more balanced architecture of development assistance 
for health which: promotes the active participation from global financing partnerships with 
other donors acting within the framework of common co-ordination structures; enables 
effective use of non-financial resources; and is informed by financial planning frameworks. 
[adapted from authors] 
India, Sierra Leone, Uganda  Assessing the impact of global health partnerships: 
country case study report (India, Sierra Leone, Uganda)  
Global Health Partnership brought more funds, but not always predictable and problematic 
at times. Donors should invest more in HSS; complement resources brought in by HSPs 
 
 